Monday, Jul. 24, 1950
Rearguard & Holding
"Fluid" was getting to be one of the most hateful words of the Korean war. Whenever the thin U.S. forces found their lines breached and themselves forced to fall back, a headquarters spokesman, either in the battle zone or in Tokyo, was almost sure to tell correspondents that the situation was "fluid."
The week began, deceptively enough, with the first solid U.S. counterattack of the war, launched with the first Sherman tanks committed to battle. In the sector south of fallen Chonan, the Reds, who had not expected U.S. tanks in action against them, were caught off balance. Lieut. Joe Griffith of Charleston, S.C. said: "The Commies took off like a bunch of scared rabbits when the tanks opened up." One Sherman ambushed an enemy T-34, crippled it at a toothsome range of only ten yards, and triumphantly towed it to headquarters for scrutiny. The Americans, who had fallen back ten miles the day before, regained all of the lost ground and dug in.
"Never Again." Triumph did not last long. The Reds smashed back with 80 of their big tanks. The U.S. tank crews found out what it means to be outnumbered, outweighed and outgunned (their 75-mm. cannon were no match for the Reds' 85s). All but two of the U.S. tanks were put out of action. Red armor and infantry tore up the U.S. infantry.
Robert Miller* of the U.P. gave appalling details of this action: "There were only 30 soldiers left out of an American company of 148 that left Japan two weeks ago. Fewer than 20% of the wounded were being evacuated." Lieut. Junior Childers of San Jose, Calif, said: "They split my company before we could get into the fight. It was a slaughterhouse. They mounted machine guns on hills above us and swept us clean. Then they threw 20-millimeter air bursts around us. Below us, tanks opened up. Nine men dropped around me and I brought out three."
Said another lieutenant who had seen heavy fighting in the European theater of World War II: "I don't claim to understand the grand strategy of this thing, but I will never again lead men into a situation like that one. We were ordered to hold at all cost. We did, but the cost was awful . . ." The Americans were driven back to the Kum River above Taejon. Most of them dug in south of the river, where they had the advantage of a flood-control dike 20 to 30 feet high.
Growth in Battle. Soon, however, it became apparent that the U.S. line on the Kum would not hold. The first three or four Red patrols which tried to cross in broad daylight were wiped out or beaten back, but large numbers of Reds apparently waded the river at night. Some of them disguised in U.S. green fatigue uniforms, attacked U.S. units from the rear. West of Taejon bend, under heavy U.S. fire, the invaders established footholds on the south bank, one at Samgyo, another at nearby Kongju.
The North Koreans suffered heavy losses in men and armor, but they pushed on doggedly. The invaders widened the Samgyo beachhead to take Nonsan (see , about 15 miles to the south, then swung northwest to attack Taejon. The town and its airfield, from which U.S. fighter craft and hospital planes had operated, were under Communist artillery fire; the airfield was evacuated.
"Shortest Possible Time." Meanwhile, on the Americans' right flank, the invigorated South Korean army was fighting valiantly (see below), but its units also fell back when the U.S. withdrawal exposed their left flank.
At week's end, Douglas MacArthur promised victory "in the shortest possible time." Earlier in the week, after the savage Red reaction to the U.S. tank attack, he had severely criticized press accounts of the battle, especially the exaggerated reports of U.S. casualties (see PRESS). He said: "Total American losses to the present time are less than 500, amounting to 42 killed, 190 wounded and 246 missing.-. . . American ground units in Korea are fighting one of the most skillful and heroic holding and rearguard actions in history. Their excellent peacetime training is reflected in the excellent combat record they are now compiling ..."
This blast was justified, in part at least; there was no question that many U.S. correspondents had given a platoon leader's view of the battle. Actually the U.S. casualties were amazingly low in proportion to the number of troops in combat--only about 3,500.
Early this week, the U.S. troops, making a brave and skillful stand around doomed Taejon, were spilling the blood of attackers who kept coming on in waves. The Reds had surprised everyone with their fighting ability and determination, but on closer acquaintance they had shown certain weaknesses, such as attacking in vulnerable masses. They also had a tendency to barrel straight ahead with their armor, using it as a sledge hammer instead of as a meat chopper. This kind of tactics permitted U.S. withdrawals when things got too hot; it also meant that the Reds were not causing as much destruction as the Germans did in the blitzkrieg phase of World War II. North Korean military weaknesses might be exploited when (and if) the U.S. buildup accumulated a real counteroffensive punch.
* For news of correspondents' troubles, see PRESS.
* This was a midweek figure. The totals were higher but unannounced at week's end.
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