AS LIPPMANN SEES IT

The foreign policy of the U. S. is against Russia and sin, in favor of prosperity and happiness. These goals have recently begun to seem somewhat inadequate to direct specific operations. The U. S., in other words, is in need of sharper definition of its foreign policy. It cannot look to Washington; Harry Truman is a public opinion President, seeking to follow, not to lead, the people. Who, then, makes public opinion? One of the most revered (even though not the most widely read) of those who try to mold opinion is Walter Lippmann. For some time he has been unhappy about U. S. foreign policy. This is his line:

Lippmann peers at the conflict between East and West through old-fashioned eyeglasses. Unlike most people--who see the conflict as one of opposing principles and faiths--Lippmann sees it in terms of opposing national powers which can achieve a working relationship through diplomacy. At the core of his thinking is a 19th Century term--the "balance of power." Wrote Lippmann last month: "There is no alternative to the negotiation of a modus vivendi based on the balance of power and of reciprocal advantages." In less Lippmannese English, this means a hardheaded deal between the U.S. and Russia.

Lippmann is opposed to the Truman Doctrine and to the thinking of State Department Planner George Kennan which helped shape it. For two years, Lippmann has argued that: 1) the U.S. cannot "contain" Russia on the whole periphery of the Soviet Union; 2) that Soviet power is unlikely to "mellow" under containment; and 3) that a settlement with Russia should be sought that would result in the withdrawal from Germany of the Western armies as well as of the Red army.

As things stand, Lippmann seems to think the U.S. has the power to deter Soviet aggression, because the Russians believe that if the Red army marches appreciably beyond its present lines, the U.S. will go to war. But this will work only so long as the Russians believe that the U.S. does not plan to attack them in a preventive war, whether they march or not.

Limited Aims. Lippman has dealt specifically with the keys to any possible U.S.-Russian settlement: Germany and China.

In Germany, Lippmann insists, the peril is Germany's "historic tendency" to join up opportunely with the Russians. He believes, therefore, that the Atlantic pact should be a shield as much against a revived Germany as against Russia; he would exclude from the pact a belt of neutral buffer states running from Scandinavia through Western Germany, Austria and Italy. Two weeks ago Lippmann expressed his fear that the State Department is planning to make Britain a junior partner in a close U.S.-British alliance, leaving Germany dominant in Europe.

As for China and Asia, "the decline of Western power in Asia is so great an historical event that for some time to come it will not be possible for any Western government to have a policy about Asia . . ." In other words, like Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Lippmann wants to wait until the dust settles. "Our policy, when we are again in a position to have one, will necessarily be limited to making such contacts as we can on the best terms that can be arranged with the Chinese authorities on or near the coast of China." He advocates "intimate consultation" with India's Nehru and support for Asia's non-Communist nationalist movements.

Smothered Clarity. Recently, advocating U.S. support for Communist Tito against Communist Stalin, Lippmann wrote: "[It] very much needs to be made clear that American military power is ranged not against Communism in a crusade for what we cherish as democracy" but against "a new and greatly enlarged Russian empire."

This--wrongheaded or not--is Lippmann at his clearest. However, most of his columns have their points tenderly smothered in hypotheses or qualifications. Here is the peroration of a column about the area of Germany given to Poland:

"If we take a stand for the return of the Eastern territories, we shall certainly alienate not only the present Polish government but virtually the whole Polish nation. On the other hand, we shall not win the Germans. For we do not hold the Eastern territory and cannot, therefore, return it to the Germans by making a declaration. They can get back their territories only by a victorious war, which would ruin Germany once more, or by a deal with the Russians which would make them the allies of the Soviet Union.

"On balance, therefore, it seems to me that our best policy is to say that the Eastern frontier is a question for the Germans, the Poles and the Russians, that we cannot decide the solution because we cannot enforce it, that we shall not attempt to arbitrate it, but that, if invited, we would be prepared to use our good offices to mediate it."

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