Victory Roll

The Navy's postwar battle with the Air Force ended abruptly last week, with the airmen slow-rolling overhead in triumphant victory. Less than a week after the centerplates had been dropped into the keel of the 65,000-ton supercarrier United States, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson issued a curt order "discontinuing construction of the vessel . . . at the least possible cost to the Government."" The decision meant only one thing: from now on the Air Force will take care of long-range strategic bombing; the Navy will be. held to the job of keeping the overseas supply lines open, and launching amphibious landings on foreign shores.

There had always been a case against the supercarrier on grounds of economy. Big enough (1,090 ft.) and roomy enough to be a base for 120 fighters or 24 medium-range bombers, the flush-decked United States had been blueprinted at $124 million. By last week, however, rising costs had boosted the Navy's own estimate to $188 million. Other estimates put the eventual cost at more than $500 million for the ship and the planes it would carry.

Movable Airfield. But the real argument against the big carrier had sprung from the turbulent Navy-Air Force scramble over wartime missions. The United States was the Navy's bid for a chance at the Air Force's strategic bombing role. Flourishing figures from World War II, the Navy claimed that attack carriers were not only the best way of bringing air power to bear at sea; as a movable, hit-&-run base, the supercarrier would be able to launch a surprise attack with atom bombs against any target anywhere.

To that, the Air Force answer was blunt: there was no reason for a second strategic air arm when its land-based 6-365 could already deliver bomb loads to any spot in the world. Besides, the airmen pointed out, the Navy could not land its heavy bombers once they had taken off. In the Air Force view, the supercarrier was a needlessly expensive duplication which could not complete its mission without the help of Air Force landing fields.

Lucrative Target. There was one other point that even Navy airmen found hard to dispute. No matter how successful the supercarrier was, one torpedo spread or a single bomb attack might put it out of action, and the United States would be the fattest target an enemy could wish for.

After talking it over with the President and consulting the joint chiefs of staff, Secretary Johnson bought the Air Force point of view. His order would not wipe out the Navy's air arm or even reduce it. Its World War II carriers (21 all told, excluding light and escort carriers) would be on hand as a prime defense against submarines, and as floating fighter, dive-bomber and torpedo-plane bases. The Navy accepted the decision glumly and tersely. One flying admiral said: "On the record, no comment; off the record, no comment."

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