Diplomacy by Handout

Secretary of State Dean Acheson was spending a quiet Sunday puttering around his Maryland farm when he first learned of the "peace offer" from Moscow. Joseph Stalin had dug into his mail sack of questions indefatigably asked by U.S. news correspondents. He picked out a tempting set sent in by I.N.S. Correspondent J. Kingsbury Smith, representing William Randolph Hearst. As a result, Hearstling Smith had a news beat, and Stalin had a good propaganda story circulated for him by the free U.S. press.

Acheson sat down and made notes on what he thought the U.S. reply should be to a proposal it had never officially received. Next day, he went over his draft with President Truman, who, like his Secretary of State, only knew what he read in the papers.

"This Desire of Mine." Harry Truman said what he had said before: he would gladly talk to Stalin--in Washington. Reporter Smith got off a quick message to Moscow: Would Stalin accept the invitation? If not, would he meet the President somewhere else? Stalin's answer was prompt: "To visit Washington has long been my desire," he confided. "I regret that at present I am deprived of the possibility of carrying out this desire of mine, since doctors strongly object to my making any long journey, especially by air or sea." He suggested that Truman come to Russia, perhaps to Yalta, or, if he would rather, "a meeting could be arranged in Poland or Czechoslovakia."*

Not until his regular midweek press conference did Acheson give the full U.S. answer. Relaxed and smiling, he dissected Stalin's offer point by point. Acheson's rebuttal was well-reasoned, neatly phrased, loftily scornful. Logically and morally, the honors were his, even if his words lacked a propagandist's simplicity and fire.

Twice Acheson repeated his theme: "The interest of the U.S. and of all the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world in peace is so fundamental that the matter of peace cannot be tampered with and cannot be used as an instrument in any international political maneuver. It will not be so used by the U.S." He added pointedly: "If I on my part were seeking to give assurance of seriousness of purpose, I would choose some other channel than the channel of a press interview."

Puzzling Answer. Deliberately, Acheson read off each question & answer in the Smith-Stalin exchange. Would Stalin "be prepared to consider the issuance of a joint declaration" asserting that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. had no intention of resorting to war? Stalin's answer was yes. "Now, I confess that I find this answer puzzling," said Acheson, since both nations were already pledged in the U.N. charter to refrain from "the threat or use of force."

Would the U.S.S.R. join with the U.S. in measures to implement this pact, "such as gradual disarmament?" Stalin's answer was "Naturally." Acheson pointed out that the U.S. demobilization had been "not gradual but . . . precipitant." With other U.N. nations, he said, the U.S. had supported attempts to settle disputes peacefully, to establish an international police force and international control of the atomic bomb. Their efforts were blocked by Soviet vetoes and intransigence.

Acheson gave the proposed Truman-Stalin meeting short shrift: Britain and France might view such a Big Two meeting as a betrayal. Acheson declared emphatically: "The Government of the U.S. would not discuss with any nation any matter which was of direct interest to other nations without the participation of the representatives of those other nations." As to Stalin's suggested meeting places, Acheson remarked drily: "We gather . . . that Premier Stalin is unhappily prevented by the condition of his health from coming to Washington because he cannot travel either by sea or air. He thus seems to be effectively grounded."

Open Channels. The remaining question he found the most interesting. Answering it, Stalin had in effect revived an old condition for lifting the Berlin blockade: postponement by the three Western powers of their plan to create a Western German state. This condition could scarcely be considered serious, Acheson suggested. "Last summer when these discussions were going on, the Western German government had not been formed ... It has still not been formed, and yet during all of this period the blockade has continued . . . The three Western powers have stressed, repeated again and again to the Soviet Union, that . . . what they are doing is purely provisional pending such agreements on Germany as a whole."

Finally, Acheson made it clear that he was slamming no doors. "All of the normal channels are open," he said, for any serious proposal to end the blockade. In other words, the door was still open, but Joe Stalin would have to do more than just stand outside and whistle.

* Stalin had never before admitted in public that he was ailing--if he was. State Department official's recalled an incident of last year, when a Soviet MVD officer named Malinin invited a U.S. intelligence officer to dinner in Berlin. During the evening, Malinin declared that Stalin was of the opinion that a meeting with Truman could settle all their differences. But Stalin could not travel: he had "already had three attacks," Malinin explained. The State Department tried to verify Malinin's report, but could neither prove nor disprove it.

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