The Diplomatic Attitude

Into Washington one day last week flew Lieut. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, a part-time diplomat, back from his fact-finding foray to China. He wore a diplomat's dark, double-breasted suit and a forbiddingly noncommunicative air. His pack of reports and recommendations was rushed to the State Department, where it was promptly labeled top secret.

For nine months the U.S. had had no China policy beyond indecisive hostility and righteous advice for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Government. From behind the scenes came rumors that the U.S. was preparing to pull out of China and rest its Asiatic defense on Japan and the Philippine Islands. Ostensibly, the Wedemeyer report was designed to help George Marshall decide what, if anything, to do next. The choice was between aid to China or abandonment of her 400 million people to the threat of Communism.

Anger in Nanking. After Wedemeyer's blast at the Chinese Government (TIME, Sept. 15), many Chinese thought they knew just what to expect. Wrote Fei Hsiao-tung, sociology professor and one of China's sharpest political commentators: "We must not be offended because the U.S. has become indifferent to China. [But] we are worried for the U.S." Reported TIME'S Nanking correspondent:

"The Chinese feel that the Wedemeyer mission was only a rubber stamp for a long-held Marshall decision to let China stew in her own juice. Just after Wedemeyer left for home, several Kuomintang elders had a session with the Generalissimo. Tears flowed. Breasts were beaten. Without additional U.S. help and with Russian intervention likely to increase, where could China turn? One leader suggested the inevitable: rapprochement with Russia, and proposed sending Elder Statesman Chen Li-fu to Moscow."

Other Chinese leaders also felt that U.S. policy was driving China into Russia's arms. Said Vice President Dr. Sun Fo, son of the late great Sun Yatsen, in an interview last week: "The results of Wedemeyer's report. . . will tell China whether it would be better for her to side with the U.S. or Russia." Premier Chang Chun strongly implied that China would side with Russia in demanding a hard peace for Japan.

Calm in Washington. This desperate Chinese reaction could scarcely be blamed, nor could it be discounted merely as a maneuver to frighten the U.S. into giving China more aid. But official Washington preserved a stolid calm. One key official at the State Department dismissed the news as unimportant, conceding only that it had raised a few hackles here & there. Said he in a tone that would scarcely have been used by Britons at their hoitiest and toitiest in dealing with "natives": "Perhaps the Chinese have been a shade more independent recently, as if they wanted to show that China was not a rubber stamp for the U.S."

Wrote China's independent newspaper Ta Rung Pao: "The diplomatic attitude of the U.S. during the past two years has been permeated with arrogance and prejudice [and] contempt. . . ." The diplomatic attitude did not seem to have changed.

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