The Road Back

Britain and the U.S. announced last week that German industry in their two zones would be based on a production ceiling of 10.7 million ingot tons of steel a year. This was quite a jump above the 5.8 million ton level set last year for all of Germany.

The U.S.-British aim was a producing western Germany that could 1) pay for itself and 2) contribute more coal, machinery, and other exports toward general European recovery. There would, however, be no immediate miracles; experts thought it would take until 1951, even with good luck, to reach the 10.7 million ton ceiling in food-short, materials-short Germany.

The French, who were consulted beforehand, did not like the new figure but might grudgingly accept it. French opposition to any rise in German production had been softened last week: the Americans and British agreed to consider a big increase in the amount of German coal and coke that would go to France. Through such increased coal deliveries the French might get enough to double their own 6 million ton steel production by 1951.

A French steel production of 12 million tons would be quite a comfort to Frenchmen, even if western Germany were turning out 10.7 million by that time. The real basis of Germany's prewar threat to France was the fact that Germany could make three times as much armament as France could. As long as the French stayed ahead, it was safe to let German industry rise. Europe would never be rebuilt if keeping the absolute level of German industry down was made the first consideration of European planning.

The Russians had their own reasons for not wanting Europe rebuilt. In Berlin, Soviet Marshal Vassily Sokolovsky greeted the new industry-level announcement with cries that the U.S. and Britain were "dismembering Germany . . . rupturing the Potsdam Agreement."

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