WHAT PRICE PEACE?

Last week, Senator Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, went into a New Hampshire railroad station to buy a ticket to Washington. He got his ticket, and a lecture with it.

"I don't know what the hell you think about this Marshall plan," the station agent said, "but I don't understand it, and by God I don't think you understand it."

"I don't claim to understand all about it," Bridges said. "Why?"

"Well, I think we've done about enough for the rest of the world and Europe," the agent said. "I see where we've spent $20 billion on them since the war ended, and they're not a damned bit better off than when we started. It's about time we used our money to do things in this country."

What is the answer to the New Hampshire station agent--and to millions of Americans who are thinking along this line? They deserve a better answer than cracks about "isolation" and "penny-pinching."

The U.S. spent $350 billion* to keep Germany and Japan from dominating the world. The main reason it cost so much was that the U.S. did not start spending in earnest until the Germans had under their control nearly all of Europe and the Japanese had the most important parts of Asia. The U.S. bought victory in about the toughest possible market.

Now the leaders of another country--Russia--want to dominate the world. Is it certain that they do, or are some nervous Americans just imagining things? The evidence of Russia's intention is overwhelming. It is stronger than the evidence of German and Japanese intentions in 1937. Communist leaders subscribe to a philosophy that says the whole world must adopt their social and economic system, and "the international soviet shall be the human race." The Communist philosophy says, further, that good men should work like beavers to bring about this world victory of Communism.

Stalin, who ought to know what Communists think, made, on Feb. 9, 1946, his now famous election speech, a key to postwar Soviet policy. In it, he assessed the chances of peace: "Perhaps military catastrophes might be avoided if it were possible for raw materials and markets to be periodically redistributed among the various countries in accordance with their economic importance, by agreement and peaceable settlement. But that is impossible to do under present capitalist conditions of the development of world economy."

If peace depends on redistribution of raw materials, and if Stalin holds such redistribution to be "impossible" under capitalism, it follows that he thinks there will be no peace as long as there is capitalism.

When the head of a great country thinks that world peace is threatened by the very existence of another social system, he ought to try to do something about it. Stalin tries. He inspires and directs Communist parties in all non-Communist countries to weaken their social systems and, if possible, to destroy them. In a nutshell, the evidence that the Communists intend to dominate the world boils down to this: 1) the Communists say they do; and 2) they act as if they mean it.

Three Roads to War

It can be taken as settled that the U.S. will go to war in an effort to stop any nation from dominating the world. In fact, twice in this century the U.S. has gone to war when it looked as if rival nations had become threats to the U.S.

The U.S.S.R. is not yet as strong as that--so there is no present reason for the U.S. to go to war. But the U.S.S.R. might start to get that strong, just as Germany did between 1933 and 1941. Once that process started, the price of safety for the U.S. would go up every year--and it might get a lot higher than $350 billion.

Here are three changes which would make a Russian-U.S. war likely, and hard for the U.S. to win:

1) If the U.S., because of a long, deep depression or serious internal unrest, became so weakened that Russia would feel safe in being much more aggressive than she now is.

2) If the Communists got control of China and/or India. To become stronger than the U.S., the Communists would have to hold China and/or India for quite a few years --perhaps as many as 30. The Japanese found that the slave labor of industrially undeveloped countries did not pay off much in the first year or two. But the Japanese did multiply the industrial production of Manchuria in a decade. If Moscow had 400 million Chinese or Indians and their resources working for it for 30 years, the Communist power would probably become stronger than the U.S.

3) If the Communists got control of Europe. In that event, the U.S. would not have 30 years to prepare for the catastrophe. The 500 million non-Russian Europeans include thousands of scientists, millions of skilled workers, millions of trained soldiers. In a few years (say five), Russia plus Europe might be stronger than the U.S. The Communists could not then be stopped from grabbing Asia, and safety for the U.S. could not be bought at any price.

A $15-Billion Premium

So the first requirement of U.S. policy is to keep Europe from going Communist. That is what the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall approach" are all about. One of the advantages the Communists have over the democrats is that the Reds thrive when want, frustration and disorder prevail, as they do now in Europe. One of the many advantages the democrats have over the Reds is that Europeans, like other people, would rather not be hungry, frustrated and disordered. The U.S. has the means to help Europe acquire food, hope and stability.

How much will it cost to help Europe get to a point where it will not drift to chaos, and from there to Communism? As of today, U.S. State Department experts figure about $15 billion, spread over seven years. That's a lot of money for an insurance premium, especially since nobody can guarantee that the insurance will pay off.

Of the $20 billion the U.S. has pumped out since the war, much was just plain wasted. The deal that looked best when it was made was the $3.75 billion loan to Britain. It did not help Britain much toward recovery, but it did supply food to stave off a British collapse (see FOREIGN NEWS). Before the U.S. decides that the British loan was a waste, somebody will have to calculate how many billions the U.S. would have had to spend if Britain had collapsed. The figure would be much higher than $3.75 billion.

Not the Hartford Way

Judged by a hard, New Hampshire dollars-&-cents standard, the Truman Doctrine was far more dubious than the British loan. Truman said, in effect, that when a country threatened by Communism got into really bad economic health, the U.S. would rush in and help it. If insurance were taken out only by the sickest people, insurance companies would not last very long. So the companies do not do business that way --at least, not the ones in Hartford.

Then Secretary Marshall came along with his Harvard speech. He did not have a plan, but he did have an idea. It was neither original nor complicated, but it was sound. Underneath it lay a line of Washington reasoning that went something like this:

"If we try helping each European nation separately, beginning with the worst risks, we will simply be pouring money down a row of rat holes, beginning with the deepest. Let the Europeans get together, figure out what they can do to help each other, and then tell us what Europe as a whole needs for recovery. If that looks like a reasonable amount, and if there is some sign that this expenditure will really get Europe on its feet, then let's go through with it."

A lot of "if" was loaded into that conclusion. European nations, for instance, will have to relax or abandon the tight net of restrictions on currency and commerce that now strangle trade between them. The French will have to put enough faith in the Allied control of Germany to let the German steel industry work for Europe at a higher production level. This will be even more difficult for a Frenchman than for a citizen of New Hampshire to resign himself to seeing another $15 billion go out of the U.S. But unless both France and New Hampshire face the facts, the "Marshall approach" will not work.

How It Looks to Moscow

How much chance has it anyway? Nobody can say until the work now beginning in Paris (see INTERNATIONAL) comes to fruit next September. But the prospects are far from hopeless. Apparently the Kremlin thinks the "Marshall approach" is a pretty good move--on the U.S. side of the board. Before Molotov in Paris turned down the invitation to participate, the argument in Moscow's Politburo may have gone like this:

(In favor of participation) "The Paris meetings will result in requests for help so high that the U.S. Congress will throw up its hands. Then Europe, disillusioned and bitter, will turn to us. So let us play along with the Paris conference, get the requests up as high as possible, and put the blame for failure on the U.S."

(Against participation) "Unattractive as this idea will be to Congress, it will realize that it has no alternative. Bevin and Bidault are strong enough to keep the requests within reason. If we get into this thing we will have to let the Eastern European countries in; that means they will be trading freely with Western Europe, and will be drawn out of our orbit. We must back away and try to save what we can--Eastern Europe."

The present pulling and straining of the Soviet satellites, anxious to get into the only prospect that offers Europe hope, attests the wisdom of the latter argument--from a. Soviet standpoint. Where will Poland find a market for her coal? How can the Russians pay Czechoslovakia for quality factory products? When Molotov at Paris broke Europe along the Stettin-Trieste line, most of the best insurance risks, most of 'he countries with high labor productivity, were not on Molotov's side of the line. If Central and Western Europe begin to revive with U.S. help, Molotov may well find the peoples of Russia's satellite countries increasingly restive.

The Lonely Man

The world, as well as the Kremlin's Politburo, wondered whether the U.S. Congress and people would back the "Marshall approach." So far, Congress is showing both a healthy skepticism and an unhealthy cynicism. One U.S. Senator said privately last week that he was willing to see Europe get $5 or $6 billion--but no more. If Europe's recovery could be bought for $5 billion instead of $15 billion, that would be fine. On the other hand, if $5 billion gets Europe only a third of the way out of the pit, $5 billion would be a waste, and $15 billion might be a good investment.

John Taber, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, has held up the emergency aid to Greece for two months while he tries to pare down the $300 million appropriation by roaring haggling questions at State Department witnesses. Even though piecemeal aid to Greece does not make much long-range sense, the crisis in that country is getting worse and John Taber does not seem to have any ideas for coping with it. Last week the Greek Government arrested 4,000 Communists on charges of plotting to take over the country (see FOREIGN NEWS). From Communist-run Albania, a new guerrilla drive over the Greek border began. Suppose either internal or external Communist pressure, or both, succeeded in overthrowing the Greek state. Does John Taber have any estimate of what it would cost to dislodge a Communist government from Athens? Or any estimate of how much a Communist coup in Greece would increase the cost to the U.S. of saving Turkey or Italy or France from Communism?

These questions face the Congress as well as the State Department. As usual, however, the Department carries the unpopular load of responsibility on its none-too-sturdy shoulders. As George Marshall faced doubting and irate Congressmen last week he might have reflected that he was not the first Secretary of State to be where he found himself. Henry Adams had noted:

"The Secretary of State has always stood as much alone as the historian. Required to look far ahead and round him, he measures forces unknown to party managers, and has found Congress more or less hostile ever since Congress first sat. The Secretary of State exists only to recognize the existence of a world which Congress would rather ignore; of obligations which Congress repudiates whenever it can; of bargains which Congress distrusts and tries to turn to its advantage or reject."

Three Tests

Nevertheless the U.S. Congress and the U.S. people had nearly always come, however reluctantly, to the point where they backed broad, essential foreign policy when both the need and the workability of a given program was clear. The need for U.S. action to stop Russia was plain enough; this summer's work at Paris would give the Congress and the people an idea of whether it was workable. To whatever Paris produced, the U.S. would apply certain tests. Among them:

1) That the U.S. will be paying for rehabilitation, not for mere relief which would open up endless vistas of spending.

2) That U.S. financial and technical experts will be able to examine how the money is spent so that the people who pay for it know it is not being frittered away.

3) That the political result of the program is a lessening of the Communist threat.

The Alternative

Is it true that the U.S. has no alternative to spending more billions on Europe? It has just one. The U.S. could start dropping atomic bombs on Russia now, before the Russians can retaliate. It could, but there isn't one chance in ten million that it will. Sixteen centuries ago a great Christian (Saint Ambrose) laid it down that Christians have no right to go to war "unless driven to it." There are enough people in the U.S. who feel the way Ambrose felt about it, so that the Russians need not stay awake nights.

For those Americans who do not agree with Ambrose, there is another--and a highly practical--reason for not jumping into a preventive war with Russia. At the end of that war, the world, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. economy would be in such a mess that the postwar chaos might create more Communists than the atomic bombs had killed. The U.S., obviously, would always fight if it had to. The trick was to keep from having to.

The "Marshall approach" is one obvious way of trying to stave off a situation in which war would be inevitable. Another attempt is the Wedemeyer mission (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS) to find out how to help China and Korea stay out of the hands of the Communists. If that mission develops a "Wedemeyer approach" to Asia, it may cost the U.S. a few billions, too.

But both together will not look big compared to the U.S. bill for World War III: $350 billion--plus. Peace between the U.S. and Russia is probable as long as the U.S. stays out in front. If Russia begins to catch up, the price of U.S. safety might go up at the rate of $15 billion a month.

* $350 billion is more than the incomes of all the American people in the years 1936-1940 inclusive, and more than all the receipts of the U.S. Government from the founding of the Republic up to the present.

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