Challenge

The American people had had enough, and the House knew it. Labor's spring strike fever had given the nation a new fit of chills. The House, even more constituent-conscious than labor-shy, reacted with a stunning strike-curb bill, then clinched its purpose by passing the measure by a stunning majority--308 to 107--plenty of votes to override a presidential veto. With the 215 Republicans, 93 Democrats broke ranks to vote for the bill.

The 66-page measure struck in three directions: at the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, at the Norris-LaGuardia (anti-injunction) Act, at Communist influence in trade unions. Its chief points (see box) were long, strong and sharp. They were nailed down by stern rules and broad new definitions. The only kind of "compulsory unionism" the bill permitted was the union shop,* and then only if a majority of the workers wanted it and the employer himself had no objection. The bill would safeguard both workers' and employers' rights to speak out against unions. It would deprive workers of the right to strike over anything but questions of wages, hours, work requirements and work conditions; strikes over any question of union security would be unfair labor practices. These rules drastically revised the so-called "Magna Charta of Labor"--the Wagner Act. By giving employers the right to ask for court injunctions when confronted by an "unlawful strike," the bill drastically revised the Norris-La Guardia Act. It attacked Communist union influence by barring not only Communists, but even ex-Communists and party-liners, from holding union office.

Against Tyranny. The House's avowed aim was to bring an end to "widespread industrial strife." That had also been the avowed aim of Congress in 1935, when it passed the Wagner Act. But the 80th Congress now thought that the hard facts of industrial strife had demonstrated the fallacy in congressional thinking twelve years ago. From an annual average of 753 strikes involving 297,000 workers before the NRA, precursor of the Wagner Act, the strike chart had climbed to 4,985 strikes involving 4,650,000 workers in 1946. Annual average of man-days lost before NRA: 10,828,000. In 1946: 116,000,000.

Numerous people had numerous explanations, aside from the Wagner Act, for this staggering and sometimes frightening phenomenon. One of the reasons was the increase in employment. But the House was certain that it had put its disciplinary finger on the basic reason. The reason was not the U.S. worker--"deprived," as the labor committee said, "of his dignity as an individual . . . cajoled, coerced, intimidated and on many occasions beaten up. . . . The employer's plight has likewise not been happy." The committee blamed the unions, which the Wagner Act had made into a "tyranny more despotic than one could think possible in a free country." Congressmen were resolved to trim down that tyranny. A minority of committeemen protested that the bill would "result in bitter and costly strikes."

Balance of Power. The bill had some holes in it; some of the ground rules were vaguely denned. But essentially it accomplished what Labor Chairman Fred Hartley Jr. and his committeemen wanted. It would restore the balance of power in labor dealings to management, which, in the apparent opinion of a majority of U.S. Congressmen, is where it belongs in a system of free enterprise.

Organized labor wailed in agony. William Green had declared: "Hartley will be classified as one of labor's chief enemies." C.I.O. spokesmen called the measure "a poisonous witches' brew." Old New Dealers in Congress echoed them.

The bill was still a long way from being law. On the other side of Congress, Senator Robert Taft's almost equally tough labor proposition had been flattened into a pancake by his own committee. The Senate would be more cautious in its labor legislation; in fact, some members of the House voted as they did because they felt secure in that belief. But the House's impressive vote also strengthened Taft, who now might be able to restore much of his bill. But whatever happened--a compromise between the two houses, a possible presidential veto even of the compromise --the House action had thrown down a challenge to the industrial U.S.

* Closed shop: only union members may be hired. Union shop: workers must join the union after they are hired.

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