The World & Democracy

"One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. . . . We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes. . . . Great responsibilities have been placed upon us."

Thus, on March 12, 1947, the President of the United States addressed the Congress, the U.S. people--and the world.

Conforming to the peculiar rules of diplomacy, Mr. Truman named no names, but left no doubt about the identity of the aggressor. It was Soviet Russia. To some Americans his words sounded almost like a declaration of war.

The Investment. As predicted, the aid for Greece and Turkey which the President recommended was an immediate $400,000,000. In addition, he asked Congress to "authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel" as advisers and supervisors of the fund (see below). In addition: "I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel." He did not guarantee that his requests would stop there. On the contrary:

"If further funds, or further authority, should be needed ... I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. . . . The United States contributed $341,000,000,000* toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one tenth of 1% of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment. . . . If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation."

If Congress acted upon his recommendations, it would mean one of the broadest projections of U.S. foreign policy in history.

The Power of Attack. Despite the professed astonishment of some Congressmen, the road the President indicated was a logical development of U.S. diplomacy. Americans are instinctive isolationists. But U.S. foreign policy, paced by a technology and know-how which straddles the world, has followed an ever expanding, inevitable line.

The direction was indicated by Monroe in 1823 when he proclaimed that the American continents were not "subjects for future colonization." It was a misconception to consider the Monroe Doctrine, which challenged all the nations of Europe, a doctrine of isolation. The policy expanded again with John Hay's "Open Door" in China. Under Theodore Roosevelt, it landed the U.S. in the middle of the world stage. It reached a climax in 1917 when Woodrow Wilson, in words which it became fashionable to sneer at in the '30s, said:

"The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. . . . We shall fight for . . . the rights and liberties of small nations. . . ."

The national agoraphobia after World War I and Franklin Roosevelt's effort to buy a way out of World War II with Lend-Lease were only zigzags in the broad U.S. policy. F.D.R. understood that when, before Pearl Harbor, he told Congress: "Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal."

Some observers described Harry Truman's new policy as another Lend-Lease. It was far more than that. It was a projection of the advice which George Marshall gave the nation at the end of World War II. He spoke then as Chief of Staff, and in military terms: "The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack." Other military leaders paraphrased it: "U.S. policy is now to wage the peace around the world."

In assessing Harry Truman's policy it was necessary to consider this fact: George Marshall, as Secretary of State, had drafted three quarters of the speech.

Background of Policy. Marshall was studying the German problem when the message came that Britain would be obliged to withdraw her support of Greece after March 31. He abandoned the German problem forthwith and turned his attention to the Mediterranean. He conferred for many anxious hours with Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower.

The decision they reached was largely a military, not a diplomatic one. Marshall took the decision to Harry Truman, who agreed with it and laid it before congressional leaders on Feb. 27. On the day Marshall left for Moscow, Clark Clifford, Truman's adviser and ghostwriter, began editing Marshall, Acheson and Eisenhower into shape. Clifford's draft was sent to Marshall, who made only a few revisions. That was the background of the statement. (Thus Henry Wallace's angry charge over the radio that Harry Truman had undermined his Secretary of State's assignment was obviously incorrect.)

No Other Choice? This week, as U.S.

Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh headed home to report, Washington was in the midst of bitter debate. Harry Truman would need Marshall's considerable prestige to balance the practical and emotional arguments against his course. Questions came from left & right.

From the high grass in left field, Henry Wallace demanded: -"How can we wage a war of nerves against Russia and expect her to take in good faith our proposals to the United Nations on atomic energy?" Considering Gromyko's recent denunciation of U.S. proposals, the question scarcely seemed relevant.

But some of the questions did require an answer. Wasn't there danger that such "independent movements" would destroy U.N.? Was it politically wise to support the government of Greece, which was hardly a model of democracy? Wouldn't this program lead to the same kind of imperialism which Great Britain had followed so long and which Americans had so sternly criticized in the past?

Said Senator Robert Taft: "We can hardly longer reasonably object to the Russians continuing their domination in Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The loans, therefore, accept the policy of dividing the world into zones of political influence. Perhaps," the Senator added, "there is no other course."

Our Alternative. From the sands of Palm Beach, the New York Times's Arthur Krock reported the uneasiness of a group of men with whom he talked one night. Among them were Joseph P. Kennedy, onetime ambassador to Great Britain, and Bernard Baruch. They saw a U.S. foreign policy leading to prodigal spending, national bankruptcy and destruction of the very democratic system which the policy sought to protect. Kennedy doubted that such investments as Truman recommended would ever succeed in stopping Communism's spread. The poverty-stricken peoples of the world, he thought, were bound to try out Communism, if only because of its glittering promises.

Kennedy had his own proposal. Let

Communism spread, meanwhile keep the U.S. fat. After the little nations had a bellyfull of Stalin's totalitarianism they would renounce it and rush joyfully to the U.S. The argument had a faint early 1941 ring.

The Way to Catastrophe. Further questions and objections pointed up risks which were moral as well as economic. Human nature being what it is, U.S. financial intervention might earn America the resentment, even the hate of beneficiaries. The program opened up a road with no visible end. Along that road were other nations in almost as desperate straits as Greece. Who would be next to need U.S. help?

The $400 million recommended for Greece and Turkey was only a down payment on a program which some experts estimated would cost $4,000,000,000 before the U.S. could even be reasonably sure of its final success.

Russia might stage an astute political retreat, while Communist propaganda would tap-tap on the U.S. conscience. Moscow indicated the line. Said Izvestia, in a bland and self-righteous editorial: "What is such monopolistic 'American responsibility' but a smoke screen for plans of expansion? Dilations to the effect that the United States is 'called upon to save' Greece and Turkey from expansion on the part of the so-called 'totalitarian states' are not new. Hitler also referred to the Bolsheviks when he wanted to open the road to conquests for himself."

Distracted by such attacks, shocked by the expense, the U.S. public might in the end withdraw its support. This was the greatest risk. If that happened, the Truman program might end in a fiasco, and Joe Kennedy's theory work out in reverse.

In Defense of Peace. For Old Soldier Marshall these must have been calculated risks. He could answer objections. U.N. was still too weak to act in such an emergency, and did not yet have the machinery to handle it. The Tsaldaris government in Greece was Western Democracy's only available instrument.

Was the program a kind of U.S. imperialism? Those Americans made uncomfortable by this word might have to find another word which did not distress them so much. For the U.S. was in a world divided between two great antagonists. Communist imperialism must be contained. U.S. influence must expand to contain it; otherwise the U.S. might be engulfed.

U.S. policy was not the imperialism of national aggrandizement. Its basic interest was in worldwide freedom. The best U.S. foreign policy was still to demonstrate to the world that democratic free enterprise was a system that worked for the benefit of all. Last week the agents of that kind of system were busy in the Middle East, where U.S. oil companies invested another $227 million--almost as much as Harry Truman asked for Greece --in the oilfields of Arabia (see BUSINESS & FINANCE). This was also a calculated risk.

The leaders of Congress, despite the press of other business (see The Congress) were ready to expedite the debate and reach the decision. If they accepted George Marshall's military theory, then they must accept the political theory implicit in Harry Truman's speech: that the only defense of a respectable peace is a bold political attack.

*First official calculation of the cost to the U.S. of World War II. It amounts to $2,410 for every man, woman and child in the U.S., or $7,333 apiece for every one of some 46,500,000 U.S. taxpayers.

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