Whose House, Whose Castle?

In barricaded Jerusalem last week a Briton, about to move into a requisitioned Jewish house, found a laconic note left for him: "My house--your castle." It was a pithy oversimplification of the whole Palestine issue. Last week Britain, unable to work out a division of Palestine's living space between Arabs and Jews, was ready to quit her position as castellan, try to get the United Nations to take over.

New Leverage. Palestine's position in the Middle East had some importance both in oil strategy and military strategy -- though both were frequently exaggerated. Nevertheless, Ernest Bevin realized that Britain was paying too much for whatever advantages Palestine gave her. Policing Palestine was a drain in pounds sterling, a drain in manpower for troops. And Palestine was a drain on British prestige, for the Arabs blamed Britain for protecting Jews, and the Jews blamed Britain for shutting off immigration and applying harsh police measures against terrorists.

Bevin's principal objective was to hold against Russia's new leverage there the Anglo-American position in the Middle East. In theory, that could be done through U.N. control of Palestine. But in practice, could it?

U.N. might be presented with the issue in these forms, among others:

P: Britain might simply propose a U.N. trusteeship for Palestine-- with herself as sole trustee, as in League days. (But all parties would then cry "Fake!" and Britain would be back where she started.)

P: Or Britain might ask for a trusteeship to be shared by several powers, including the U.S., which has always ducked responsibility for Palestine. (If Britain forced the issue in U.N., there might be no chance for the U.S. to duck.)

P: Or, conceivably, Britain might ask for direct U.N. administration in Palestine, on the model of Trieste.

P: Or Britain might make no recommendations, leave the terms up to U.N.

New Cops? Whichever way Britain tossed the problem of Palestine to U.N. --and whichever way U.N. finally took hold of it--the big question was going to be: Could U.N.'s multilingual committees agree on a solution, and make it stick, where Britain had failed? If enough Arabs or enough Jews wanted their own way badly enough, there was going to be plenty of work for a U.N. police force (which does not yet exist); U.N. cops might have to quell the same kind of disturbances on refugee ships and take the same glares British cops were taking last week (see cut).

Tough as the problem looked, it was the kind of problem U.N. had been created to face. Last year, in Persia and elsewhere, direct clashes involving the Great Powers themselves put U.N. on the spot. Here was a much smaller, if equally distressing problem. If U.N. could not contribute to the solution of the Palestine problem, what could? And what would U.N. do about any of the disputes over houses and castles that flared or smoldered all over the world?

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