"LEAST ABHORRENT CHOICE"

Since his retirement as Secretary of War in September 1945, Henry Lewis Stimson has been living quietly at his West Hills, L. I. estate, reading, writing up his diary and reflecting on his long years of public service.

This week probably the most important chapter of that long career came from Stimson's pen, published in Harper's Magazine under the title The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. In it Stimson disclosed that: 1) he, more than any other man, was responsible for the decision to wipe out Hiroshima and Nagasaki; 2) the two bombs dropped were the only ones which the U.S. had in store at the time. He made the record explicit and complete.

Legitimate Weapon. In the fall of 1941 the question of atomic energy first came to his attention when President Roosevelt appointed him to a committee on atomic policy. In May 1943, Stimson was made directly responsible to the President for the administration of the entire project.

"At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of our Government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war." It was considered to be "as legitimate as any other of the deadly explosive weapons of modern war."

Morals & Techniques. Stimson and Roosevelt discussed the matter on March 15, 1945. That was their last conference. The next time Stimson went to the White House he went to explain the whole titanic undertaking to a man "whose only previous knowledge of our activities was that of a Senator who had loyally accepted our assurance that the matter must be kept a secret from him."

"Within four months," Stimson informed President Truman, "we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history. . . ."

An interim committee with a panel of four scientists was set up to keep the President advised. On June 1 the committee resolved that 1) "the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible, 2) used on a dual target--that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, 3) used without prior warning."

The committee considered giving the Japanese a demonstration "in some uninhabited area" in the hopes of frightening them out of the war. The idea was rejected. The demonstration might be a dud. "Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender." The scientists agreed: "We see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."

"Psychological Weapon." Henry Stimson searched his soul.

Japan "must be administered a tremendous shock." Otherwise, "only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace." He compiled a tally of debits and credits in property and in human relationships and human lives:

The Allies were faced with the task of destroying an armed force of 5,000,000 men and 5,000 suicide aircraft. Without the atomic bombs, a total of 5,000,000 Americans would have to be committed to a Japanese invasion. "Operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties to American forces alone. . . . Enemy casualties would be much larger."

Resistance would be fanatical. It would be necessary to leave the Japanese Islands "even more thoroughly destroyed" than Germany. Continued B-29 fire raids would wreak more damage than any atomic raids. But "the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon."

The Ultimate Responsibility. It was Harry Truman who had to make the final, terrible decision.* But "the ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to the President rested upon me, and I have no desire to veil it."

The New Mexico test occurred as the Big Three conferred at Potsdam. An ultimatum, which did not, however, hint at the bomb, was delivered. Japan's premier, Suzuki, replied haughtily that it was "unworthy of public notice."

A list of targets was presented to Stimson for his approval. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were doomed.

The Face of Death. Henry Stimson did not see how any man could have done otherwise "and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face." Did his apologia have "a harsh and unfeeling sound?" He reflected: "As I look back over the five years of my service as Secretary of War I see too many stern and heart-rending decisions to be willing to pretend that war is anything else than what it is. The face of war is the face of death. . . . This deliberate premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice."

* A fact which the President emphasized this week when he rebuked Dr. Karl Compton for failing to point that out in a recent Atlantic Monthly article.

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