Atomic Diplomacy

For more than nine months, Bernard Baruch, perennial adviser to Presidents, had devoted himself to synthesizing an atomic energy policy for the U.S. and getting it approved by the U.N. As always, he had flanked himself with able and distinguished aides who, like himself, took no pay. By & large, Baruch had been enormously effective. With only Russia and Poland abstaining, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission had adopted the Baruch plan (TIME, Jan. 6), passed it up to the Security Council, where the veto question must finally be faced.

Though much had been done, there was much more still to do. But last week Baruch quit the team, turned in his suit and took his best men with him. He told Harry Truman that his task was fulfilled. From here on, he thought, it would be better for the U.S. to be represented by the same delegate on both the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission. That man would be Vermont's earnest ex-Senator Warren Austin.

Though good neighbors and better friends, Secretary of State Byrnes and Elder Statesman Baruch had differed over emphasis on abolition of the veto in atomic matters. Baruch had insisted that it must be abolished; Jimmy Byrnes did not think it was all-important. Now Warren Austin would execute the policy, taking his cue from Byrnes.

For those who must carry on where he left off, and write a binding treaty, Baruch declared: "A way has been found and pointed out to control atomic energy for peace and prevent its use for war. The way is marked by buoys and lighthouses showing clearly the dangers and how to avoid them. . . . The treaty . . . must contain all, not parts of the program. Otherwise mankind will be deluded into a false sense of security. The dangers are great, but the way is clear if man but wills it so."

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