Shortcomings

Without warning, President Truman--who has a way of acting abruptly in foreign affairs--issued a new statement last week on U.S. policy in China. On the surface, there was nothing new in the statement, and it occasioned little reaction or comment. Actually, in a negative way, it would have far-reaching results.

In some 3,500 words, the President merely restated the line he laid down just a year ago when he sent General George Catlett Marshall to China as his special representative. The line: to end the civil war and bring the Chiang government and the Communists together within a democratic framework.

To some extent, the statement was also a year's-end audit of U.S. books in China. Admittedly on the debit side was the failure of General Marshall's mission to break the Kuomintang-Communist deadlock. But on the credit side was the repatriation of nearly 3,000,000 Japanese troops, and a slash in U.S. troop strength from 113,000 to less than 12,000.

Too Partial? But beyond that, and far more important, the statement was a perfect illustration of the split within the State Department over U.S. China policy. It had been drafted by State's Director of Far Eastern Affairs, quiet, soft-spoken John Carter Vincent, whose last trip to China had been in the company of Henry Wallace in 1944. As a leader of the bloc which believes U.S. policy is too partial to Chiang, Vincent had already been labeled a stooge for Yenan.

He had responded readily when Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson had suggested a review of U.S. policy. His statement had been cleared for facts by the Army and Navy, and given an O.K. by General Marshall.

But why had it been issued at all?

Too Late? President Truman had been under heavy pressure from two sides: those who wanted all-out aid for Chiang and those who wanted to cut present U.S. help still further. The President might have thought that, as is his wont, he was taking a position squarely in the middle. Actually, he was endorsing a policy which is already out of date.

In recent months Generalissimo Chiang has won brilliant military victories which many an American detractor of Chiang thought he never would. In the meantime, the Communists have become more stubborn. The delicate and drawn-out negotiations which General Marshall, together with U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, had been carrying out, have come to a virtual standstill. If any new presidential statement were issued, it should have reconsidered China policy in the light of current events. As matters now stand, a new and realistic statement will be difficult to draft for some time to come.

Discussing the shortcomings of the Truman statement, the New York Herald Tribune put its finger on the biggest: "Mr. Truman might have said that the U.S. wanted a strong China and was most determined in its opposition to the Russian desire for a weak China. There seems to be no advantage to be gained from reticence on such subjects."

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