"The Wisdom of the U.S."

In the Luxembourg Palace bar, Ernest Bevin wrapped his big hand around a Scotch & water and ruminated: "A drink is good any time, but it's better when you need it." How much he needed it, he indicated when a fellow drinker asked: "What goes on, anyway?" Replied Ernie: "I don't know. I just sit and listen. I know that if I fall back on the wisdom of the U.S. I will be all right. Jim will have a formula."

No Retreat. Whatever his formulas, Jimmy Byrnes was sticking to one objective: peace treaties must be made with the former Axis satellites this summer. But first the Trieste issue had to be settled. The Italian port on the Adriatic was a symbol of the struggle between Western democracy and Soviet imperialism. If Tito succeeded in taking Trieste from the Western-backed Italian republic, Russia's prestige would rise mightily.

Molotov finally offered a compromise--putting Trieste under dual Italo-Yugoslav sovereignty. But growing clashes between Italians and Slovenes in the city already showed how hopeless such a plan would be. When Byrnes turned it down, Molotov snapped: "If you mean that no compromise is possible, why not say so?" Byrnes shot back: "Because it isn't true. I have accepted several compromises. . . . So far as I can see you have retreated nowhere."

No Bases. Molotov began to bend. He agreed with the U.S.-British view that only trifling changes should be made in the Austrian-Italian border. As a result, the Big Four turned down Vienna's demand for the controversial southern Tyrol, in spite of monster demonstrations at Innsbruck.

Molotov then announced that he agreed that France be given Tenda and Briga-- two small Italian districts near the French border. Always quick to seize an opening, Byrnes asked: Why not talk now about the Dodecanese? The Russian interpreter was still translating this when Molotov agreed that the archipelago (which guards the Western entrance of the Dardanelles) should be returned, demilitarized, to Greece. The amazed silence that fell on the conference room was broken by Byrnes, who said dryly: "It is taking me a moment to catch my breath."

But Molotov's conciliatory mood was short-lived. The deadline set by Byrnes for clearing up the agenda, June 28 (it happened to be the 27th anniversary of the Versailles Treaty and the 32nd anniversary of Archduke Ferdinand's assassination at Sarajevo), had arrived. Besides Trieste, other issues remained unsolved: free navigation on the Danube, Russia's insistence on Italian reparations, the economic clauses in the Balkan treaties and, last but not least, the "German question."

Byrnes insisted that the 21-nation conference be called for July 20--that would give the ministers plenty of time to agree.

"But even if we do not, the conference must be held." Britain's Bevin and France's Bidault spoke up for an early conference. Gazing steadily at Molotov, Byrnes said: "It is now clear who is exercising the veto. I want to know how much longer he is going to veto the peace of the world!"

He added: "I will sit here no more arguing over whether the word should be 'and' or 'but' . . . haggling over commas and semicolons. If the conference is not held, the responsibility is clear."

No Worse. Bidault then offered a complicated compromise calling for Big Four plus U.N. plus joint Italo-Yugoslav rule of Trieste for ten years. (Senator Vandenberg called it "something out of Gilbert & Sullivan . . . more government per square inch than ever established anywhere.") Nobody liked the plan, not even Bidault; but all agreed to study it.

At week's end the gloom was slightly less thick; no man could say that agreement was in prospect, but the odds were that Bevin would need his drinks less urgently this week than last.

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