They Called It Intelligence

The Pearl Harbor Committee turned from diplomatic to military witnesses. Two facts were quickly established: 1) the Japs--sometimes through carelessness, sometimes through code messages--gave the U.S. much more advance notice of the Pearl Harbor attack than has been generally realized; 2) thanks to stupidity in Washington and in the field, the U.S. took the least possible advantage of the warnings.

To the stand went balding, bumbling Major General Sherman Miles, wearer of four rows of ribbons, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence in the crucial days of 1941. Into the record went a long series of Japanese code messages intercepted before Dec. 7. Most significant: instructions sent by Tokyo on Sept. 24, ordering a spy in Honolulu to divide Pearl Harbor into five sectors, report on the ships at anchor in each.

Asked a committee counsel: "Isn't that type of message of a special significance?"

Answered onetime G-2 Miles: "The message . . . was not taken alone. It was one of a number ... to all points of the world, to follow the movement of our vessels."

Q. It looks like a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

A. That's exactly what it looks like, now that we know Pearl Harbor was bombed.

Q. Wasn't this message quite different from the others? . . . Have you found any others like this?

A. I have not found any similar.

Q. One of the functions of a properly functioning G-2 would have been to single this out and attempt to evaluate its significance, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, sir. But we did not see the significance at that time that we now see in the light of subsequent events.

Opportunity Keeps Knocking. On Nov. 15, the Jap spy was instructed to send reports twice a week on ships in Pearl Harbor; on Nov. 29 he was asked for Pearl Harbor reports "even when there are no movements." Both messages were decoded well in advance of the attack. General Miles conceded that they gave "added significance to the first message." But Intelligence paid no particular heed, said nothing about them to Lieut. General Walter C. Short, the Army commander in Hawaii.

Other intercepted messages, sent between Nov. 24 and Dec. 6, were even more revealing. Tokyo was asking for detailed information on ship movements and schedules, for any reports of barrage balloons over the harbor. The Honolulu spy was reporting that there appeared to be no aerial reconnaissance, that "opportunity is still left for a surprise attack."

But these messages were not decoded in time. The Signal Corps's "Magic" project, which held the secret of the Jap code, was short of men and facilities. General Miles "assured" himself that the work was being done as fast as possible under the circumstances, decided that there his responsibility ended.

Other facts disclosed by Miles:

P: Jap messages decoded by "Magic" were seen by only a few top brass hats, were not always shown to the President, were not sent to commanders in the field at all. (The Army & Navy were afraid the Japs might learn their secret.)

P: Neither Army nor Navy Intelligence placed any credence in a report from Tokyo by Ambassador Grew, in January 1941, that the Peruvian Minister had learned "from many sources, including a Japanese source" that the Japs planned to open the war with a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. (Intelligence officers somehow figured out that no Jap in a position to know would be so stupid as to say.)

P: The Navy high command warned Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on Dec. 3 that Jap diplomats and consuls all over the world were destroying their papers and codes. General Miles did not ask the Navy to pass this message along to General Short at Honolulu. Said he: "That was not considered necessary. ... I believed that the Navy messages were being transmitted to the Army in Hawaii and vice versa."

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