C.E.D. v. Normalcy

The price the U.S. paid for "normalcy" after World War I was the depression of the '30s. "The U.S. shall not again be victimized by a nostalgia for normalcy." In such businessman's English, the Committee for Economic Development's research committee presented its plan for full employment to President Truman and Congress. The U.S. must move courageously, said the committee.

"Premature removal of all wartime restrictions . . . could start an inflationary price boom beyond the power of added production to check."

Once past this reconversion danger, the committee estimated that the nation must provide 53,000,000 to 56,000,000 jobs --7,000,000 to 10,000,000 more than before the war. The bulk of these new jobs must be in private industry. But the committee put the responsibility for a healthy economic climate on labor also and, most of all, on the Federal Government.

To help the Government do its big job, the committee recommended the appoint ment of 1) a President's commission on full employment, composed of a "small working body of the ablest men to be found"; and 2) a joint congressional committee on full employment. They would work out a "coordinated Government program for high level employment," lay down the policies to carry it out.

On the all important question of what the Government's fiscal policy should be, the committee advocated a compensatory budget for the U.S.--i.e., a federal budget balanced over the business cycle instead of every year. With a calm assurance that will raise the hackles of conservatives, the committee said: "It is generally agreed that an annual balance of the budget is impractical."

Despite this plumping for "high productive employment," the committee carefully refrained from endorsing the pending Murray full employment bill. But, said C.E.D. Chairman Paul G. Hoffman cautiously: the committee's plan does "not conflict" with the Murray bill.

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