Anatomy of Failure

Before the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London, Britain's Ernest Bevin told a friend: "If Molotov bangs his fist on the table and yells at me, I will bang my fist and yell right back at him." This childishness, not to be confused with toughness, befitted neither the great tradition of British diplomacy nor the dire necessities of 1945.

Foreign Commissar Molotov was tougher than ever before, and more tightly bound by his instructions. U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes offered him a compromise (virtually excluding France from Balkan discussions) which was generous to the point of humiliation. Molotov cabled home for instructions, got an answer: "Stick to your brief."

"A Little Bomb." At a dinner party, one of the conference's few pleasant interludes, Molotov said of Byrnes: "He doesn't need to persuade anyone. He just has to hold up a little bomb." A delegate who heard him remarked: "Mr. Molotov never makes jokes just to be funny." Undoubtedly, Mr. Molotov did not think the atomic bomb was funny.

More than at any former conference of World War II and its unpeaceful peace, the negotiators struck attitudes and took extreme positions for the sheer sake of bargaining. Quibbling over details had vastly increased. Molotov won no friends by arguing for an hour and 40 minutes over the wording of a conference communique, later issuing his own statement.

He jumped the gun on two issues: Japan (see below) and Hungary. He knew the U.S. was prepared to recognize Hungary. But, instead of waiting until that happened, his Foreign Office announced one-way Soviet recognition plus a trade treaty. The Russian-influenced Hungarian press played up the Russian move, barely mentioned the U.S. gesture.

The Russians deserved much of the blame. But the others were not without sin. The U.S. delegation was badly briefed. Within the delegation, sharp differences developed. To some observers, Byrnes gave the impression of a man who had already convinced himself that Europe's problems were insoluble. This attitude encouraged the Russians to doubt that a strong U.S. position would be maintained very long.

To What End? Such was the anatomy of failure in London. But the details were beside the point.

The Council had only one purpose: to begin translating the Big Three agreement made in principle at Potsdam into workable, specific understandings. And Potsdam was a sequel of Teheran and Yalta. If the failure at London proved to be permanent, then the Big Three's whole structure of postwar peace--the United Nations Organization, Bretton Woods, etc.--would be doomed to failure. The "one world" of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin would be the world of blocs, East v. West, whose outlines showed nakedly in London. The spectacle alarmed everyone--especially the conferees who refused to assume that the better world was lost.

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