What of UNRRA?

With victory in Europe, men turned their eyes to UNRRA. What had this unwieldy, $2,000,000,000 United Nations Relief & Rehabilitation Administration accomplished to date? And what would it do now? The answer to the first question was: not much. The answer to the second UNRRA began to write last week.

UNRRA, despite its international character, is predominantly American. The U.S. contributed the lion's share (40%) of its funds. Its main office is in Washington, in a converted apartment building on Du Pont Circle. Its director general is an American: balding, easygoing Herbert H. Lehman, onetime Governor of New York.

Thus, while any future success of UNRRA may possibly be credited to international cooperation, its failures will almost surely be laid at the door of the U.S. And in its 18 months of existence, UNRRA has been called a failure numberless times, by friends and enemies alike.

It has not yet been a complete failure. But to date it has proved almost completely inadequate; it has only chipped away at its enormous problem. Its record:

Greece. On April 1, UNRRA took over the overall relief job from the British military. Some 250 UNRRA personnel are at work in Greece.

Yugoslavia. UNRRA took over the relief job on April 15, under an agreement with the Tito government. Work done so far: negligible. Controller: Tito.

Middle East. UNRRA camps in the Middle East are now caring for 100,000 displaced Greeks, Yugoslavs and Poles. Of these, some 43,000 will be repatriated as soon as ships are available, possibly within the next four months. The rest do not want to go back home.

Poland and Czechoslovakia. The first shipment of supplies for Poland and Czechoslovakia--10,000 tons--has arrived at a Black Sea port. Control of distribution: Russian.

Italy. Supplies averaging about 15,000 tons monthly are arriving in Italy--to supplement the deficient diet of 2,000,000 mothers and children. The program is operated by 200 UNRRA workers.

Western Europe. Very limited quantities of emergency food supplies (flour, coffee, chocolate, sugar, salt, etc.) have been shipped into France, Belgium and The Netherlands. But since all three of these nations are "paying" countries in the UNRRA pool, they will receive no regular UNRRA supplies. Some 60 UNRRA teams of 13 workers each are now in Western Europe, helping to repatriate foreign workers. UNRRA does not feed the displaced persons (the U.S. Army does that).

What's Missing? Considering the fanfare with which UNRRA was begun, and the vastness of its treasury, this record is small potatoes. One thing UNRRA does not lack is cash. But it woefully lacks: 1) prestige, 2) management, 3) efficient personnel.

As long as the war was on in Europe, UNRRA was the rankest stepchild at the combined United Nations food-&-supply table. It got only what the military and Lend-Lease did not want, and it had to fight to get that. Its allocations from the various combined boards in Washington were merely "hunting licenses" to get the allocated supply if UNRRA could find it lying around loose.

The military snubbed UNRRA: not until last November did General Eisenhower sign an agreement permitting it to come into liberated areas. The Russians cared little for it either--unless they could control it.

The Russians have not paid their allocation in full; they have refused any cooperation in Poland, except the belated opening of ports to receive supplies. UNRRA has not yet signed an agreement with the Lublin Government.

"The Hell with It." In Washington, UNRRA's management is hopelessly enmeshed in red tape. Example:

If an UNRRA employe on the operating level in Washington wants to straighten out some tangled matter with his opposite number in the London office, he writes a letter. It moves through UNRRA channels--to the division chief, the chief of requirements and allocations, and finally to the appropriate deputy director. Having thus gathered several other signatures, it is ready to move out. The process is repeated in reverse in the London office, and if the recipient answers, the rigmarole begins all over again. Said one UNRRA employe last week: "By the time we get an answer through this jungle we've said the hell with it."

UNRRA now has some 3,200 employes, 1,900 in the field, 1,300 in Washington and London offices. But not even UNRRA's staunchest defenders claim that its personnel is anywhere near competent. Average salary for a field worker is $3,600. Starting late in the hiring field, UNRRA found most capable men already in the Army or in better-paying Government or private jobs. What UNRRA got, in general, were culls, drifters through Government hiring halls, and plain incompetents.

The Test. It is quite possible that even with better management and personnel UNRRA could not have achieved an impressive record before the end of hostilities in Europe. Herbert Hoover's famed United States Food Administration in World War I did not really get down to business until after the Armistice. Then Mr. Hoover was able to hire 1,500 employes out of the Army and Navy. (The U.S. military is now prepared to release some men for UNRRA work.)

Relief Administrator Hoover had one great advantage: he was the absolute boss, responsible to no one except the President; there were no international complications. But he also moved with vigor and energy.

Last week UNRRA's Director General Lehman--no Herbert Hoover in his performance up to now--revamped his staff, announced that he would now spend as much time in Europe as in Washington. It was high time; the whole world was watching.

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