Pattern of Power

In the first five days:

U.S. attitudes hardened and clarified. The biggest development was a new approach to Russia.

It was not a new policy; it was a new, tougher manner, and it had its dangers as well as its advantages. For the Russians, too, could play a tough game. Beyond a reasonable point, mere toughness could wreck the Big Three and doom world organization at the start.

This week the Russians, roundly beaten on the Argentine issue (see below) saw proof enough that they could not control the world's vote in open assembly even when they had a good case. Intelligence and patience, as well as toughness, would be needed to keep the Big Three in one family.

World attitudes toward the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and their Big Power sponsors also clarified:

P: The 40-odd smaller powers made it clear that they dislike, will try to temper, but will not strenuously oppose the concentration of responsibility for security in the Big Powers. There was absolutely no move for real political equality in the new world organization. P: Canada's Mackenzie King and the Latin Americans put great stress on the neglected economic and social aspects of Dumbarton Oaks. Many signs indicated that the Economic and Social Council will loom much larger in the final organization than it does in the original proposals.

P: There was much talk of justice. There was even a little action. China's amendments, designed to establish "principles of justice and international law," were accepted by the Big Three and written into the proposals. But the sentiment for a heavier dependence on justice had yet to take any positive, coherent form. P: | Power patterns, shaping up at the conference, foreshadowed the patterns of the world organization. A 14-nation executive committee included the Big Three, France and China, lesser members tied more or less to the U.S. (Mexico, Brazil, Chile), Russia (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), and Britain (Australia, Canada. New Zealand). Everyone saw that on the rock-bottom security issues of the future, virtually every small power would be tied to one of the Big Three. But on minor and intermediate issues, the smaller powers kept their independence.

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