Despair on the Eve

Beyond the din of jeep-ridden Algiers, in the airy Moorish hall of the foremost seminary for colonial jeunes filles, General Charles de Gaulle and his troubled colleagues of the French Committee of National Liberation debated the signs of an approaching catastrophe.

The Seed of Despair. Baffling delays seemed to block the path of De Gaulle's proposed visit to London. The Committee's message to Washington to find out whether the U.S. planned to have a representative at the London discussions had gone unanswered for nearly two weeks. The U.S. had decided not to participate, but the French had no direct word.

There were other irritations. Slick, sleek Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, big-time oilman, banker and part owner of the prewar pro-Fascist Paris Jour, had contrived to slip out of Algiers, turn up in Madrid. With him was Jean Rigaud, long his secretary, fixer and crony and a member of the short-lived Giraud government. The Gaullists suspected that Allied officials had supplied the passes and transportation, that a serious effort to save the skins of many Vichymen was being prepared.

At the end of a long, sharp session, and just one day before its first birthday, the Committee picked up the solemn request of the Assembly, made three weeks before, and formally declared itself to be the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Many Committeemen had previously opposed the change; only the barbs from London and Washington goaded them into making it now. The gauntlet was down; Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill would have to decide whether to pick it up, try to kick it aside, or ignore it.

The Price of Despair. From Algiers came a vivid indictment of Washington's policy of limited, insufficient recognition (all hands blamed President Roosevelt more than Prime Minister Churchill). Cabled New York Timesman Harold Callender, who used to defend the State Department's attitude toward De Gaulle:

"The French situation, as judged here, could hardly be more tragic or bear greater forebodings of further tragedies to come.

"The French Committee [is] in a mood of mingled despair--despair over the immediate outlook from their point of view --and puzzlement at the Allies' attitude, which is believed here to result from an incredible lack of comprehension of French problems. . . .

"Elaborate plans for France devised by members of the Committee have been shelved pending clarity from the Allied side. For those plans all hinge on Allied action in both the military and the economic spheres, and the French just do not know what action in either sphere is going to be. Such indications as they have only intensify their misgivings, which approach desperation. . . . Neither in London nor in Washington, to judge by all evidence available here, is there anything like an adequate appreciation of the plight of France."

On with Despair? Washington stood pat. A correspondent summed up the State Department view:

"The only questions the U.S. wants to discuss with De Gaulle are those relating to the provisional civil administration of France, and General Eisenhower is already empowered to handle them. When De Gaulle gets to London he can go see Eisenhower.

"The French, wittingly or unwittingly, sometimes give the impression of ignoring Eisenhower's authority. Maybe the Department will have to recall it to them once more and then explain what it means. As Mr. Hull has stated, we are interested in having law and order assured. But that is all and we still do not intend to go into discussions on any other matter."

In short: no further recognition, no attempt to ease the despair of Frenchmen.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.