Kesselring's Troubles

Somewhere in Italy last week a German did the best he could. The German was Luftwaffe Field Marshal & General Albert Kesselring, 58, a handsome Bavarian who once was jolly and charming, a soldier and airman who once was counted among the victors of history. He had directed the air actions against Poland, Holland and Belgium, commanded one of the fleets which bombed London. He was now commander of all Axis land, sea and air forces in the Mediterranean theater.

The chief thing that he did was negative. He, or his superiors in Berlin, refused to let Sicily be a second front. In Sicily the Germans risked just so many planes, so many tanks, so many German troops--probably no more than 10,000. Their total force was not enough to hold Sicily; it was enough only to harass and delay the invaders. But it was used with economy and considerable effect.

Allied air headquarters in North Africa reported that famed Baron Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen, a remote cousin of the World War I hero, had been sent to the Mediterranean to command Kesselring's air forces. The Allied statement said that Kesselring and Richthofen had quarreled before, suggested that they may be quarreling now.

Kesselring had more vital matters to concern him. He could not depend upon the Italians at home or those in the field under General Alfredo Guzzoni, commander in Sicily. On occasion the Italians fought fiercely, gave up only when further combat was hopeless. But when they surrendered, they surrendered in crowds. As in North Africa, Italian soldiers and officers hated the Germans. Soldiers complained that the Germans took all the food; Italian airmen, that the Germans took the good planes and hangars.

The Germans showed the same contempt for the Italians that they had displayed in Africa. But the Germans captured in Sicily were also angrily certain that their superiors had been caught without an adequate plan of defense. They complained that many of their unit commanders were no good. The German soldiers fought well, and their divisions as a whole put up a performance which Allied commanders will remember when they assess the German Army's ability to defend the continent. But in captivity the Germans had the sound of men who knew that they were condemned to sacrificial defense, in an area which their superiors had expected to lose.

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