Body Punch

Crushing air and infantry superiority delivered the knockout blow in Tunisia, but that punch ended a round of brutal infighting; it finished off an opponent already left breathless, staggering and backtracking from the murderous body punching of the Allied artillery.

A captured German, seven years a soldier, said: "Never have I been in artillery fire like the Americans'. The concentrations were so thick we were stupefied by the concussions." Another prisoner asked whether the U.S. artillery was belt-fed or clip-fed; fire had poured down on his position so fast that he thought the Americans must have developed automatic cannon of field-gun caliber.

Doctrine of Mass. Allied artillery technique comes straight from the handbooks of Oklahoma's Fort Sill, London's Woolwich. Main rule: for decisive results, artillery must be massed. British practice is to place senior officers far ahead of the batteries in radio-equipped observation posts. Each officer commands the fire of as many as 100 guns, mostly 25-pounders (roughly equivalent to U.S. 105-mm. howitzers) and they can bring the entire weight of metal to bear on any point in an area of about 50 sq. mi.

The British cleared the way for their drive into Tunis with exactly such a mass artillery barrage, poured for three hours on crumbling German positions in the Medjerda Valley.

Doctrine of Accuracy. U.S. methods of concentration are similar, although some details of communication and command differ. Mass fire requires accurate surveys to link the batteries to each other and all batteries to the same target. All artillery in the U.S. II Corps had common reference grids for their map work; when the Corps command wanted a special target pounded, all batteries within range could lay on simultaneously within a few moments.

During the decisive stages of the Tunisia battle, German infantry units suffered an average of 50% casualties from the pounding of U.S. mass fire, mainly from time-fused shells set to burst over their heads. Enemy Panzer crews appeared unwilling to cross through the wall of fire built up against them; in the El Guettar battle four U.S. battalions panicked an advancing force of 32 German tanks, forced the crews to abandon the vehicles.

Long Tom & Others. The Nazis were heavily outgunned, but made good use of the artillery they had while there was room left to maneuver. How much they were depending on mobility can be judged by one report: U.S. guns directed counterbattery fire on 100 German artillery positions, and in only six cases were guns later reported firing again from the same positions. The rest had been moved out or been wrecked.

German artillery uses 88-mm. and 105-mm. rifles, which outrange U.S. 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers. But U.S. artillery units had 155-mm. rifles which they call "Long Toms" and which outrange anything the Germans had. Latest version of the Long Tom is a self-propelled model, mounted on an M-4 tank chassis, has a higher value combination of fire power and mobility than U.S. gunners have ever seen before. U.S. ordnance is preparing other lethal surprises for the foe, among them a huge 240-mm. (9.6 in.) howitzer with far greater power, accuracy and mobility than similar monsters of World War I. This steel brute travels in two loads on highspeed trailers, has such refinements as a battery crane which hoists it into shooting position, a clamshell bucket which digs the emplacement holes for its split trails.

Gunners know that the infantryman is right in saying that artillery never won a battle by itself. But it can vastly speed the job of the infantry.

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