Monday, Mar. 29, 1943
Nothing Quick or Cheap
"Men from a destroyer told us," said one of the survivors, "that they never encountered such a tremendous concentration of the enemy's U-boat force."
The survivor, safe in a British port, told how the huge pack of U-boats had closed in on his convoy one dim evening. Losses were heavy in the night. After his ship was sunk the next day, he saw R.A.F. Sunder-lands and Catalinas, and later land-based bombers, attack the pack. The survivor doubted German claims that the U-boats had put down 32 eastbound Allied ships totaling 204,000 tons.
The battle gave great point to the Allies' first announcement of a joint attempt to lick their most serious problem. That attempt has been in process for weeks (TIME, March 15), but was made public and official for the first time last week.
Against One Man. For some time there had been public agitation in Britain and the U.S. for setting up a joint command, under one man who would be the anti-submarine boss. Last week Secretary Knox disclosed that the Allies had rejected joint command and had chosen in its place a scheme which they thought would work even better.
The U.S. Navy announced that a series of conferences between U.S., British and Canadian officers had been taking place, and would continue, in Washington and London. The result would be a pooling of information and tactics which, the communique confidently asserted, would achieve "the best methods of employing the Allied escort vessels, anti-submarine craft and aircraft in defeating the U-boat menace."
The Allies were already building up their anti-submarine fleet with new vessels such as the U.S. Navy's 300-ft. Destroyer Escort. The conferees did not devise any quick or cheap "solution," but they set forth exactly what each nation could expect from the others, so that maximum use could be made of woefully minimum equipment. Presumably, they provided for coordination of the various local commands, so that tactics will become both uniform and effective.
For One Tactic. But most important of all, the conferees devised a tactic which will make it possible for the Allies to use their equipment offensively against the U-boat, not passively and defensively. The tactic was designed to counter the U-boat scheme of hunting in wolf packs.
Its essence: hunting the packs in packs.
So far as possible, the anti-submarine packs will operate as the U-boats operate, in long-standing teams. This will allow the units to get to know each other well, to move swiftly and smoothly together, with the least possible signaling and duplication of effort.
The advantage of the continuing conferences is that the participants--an impressive variety of men and services--will be able to give this tactic a fair try. If it fails, they can devise another, as a single commander might not be big enough or quick enough to do.
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