Muddled Draft

The Administration's manpower plans were so muddled that no man of draft age could be certain of his status; none could know when or whether he would be working for the Army or Paul V. McNutt.

In a maze of changing draft rules, moves for industrial conscription, bills to defer and furlough farm workers, only one decision was clear--by the end of 1943 the U.S. would have an armed force of 11,000,000 men. Franklin Roosevelt told newsmen they could bank on that.

With smooth-running efficiency Selective Service machinery had moved the first 5,000,000 men into uniform. But fortnight ago, SSS hit one of the worst snarls in military conscription since the U.S. entered World War II: 1) Manpower Czar Paul McNutt switched the yardstick for deferment from dependency to essentiality; 2) local draft boards, tussling with changing classifications and categories, were unable to keep pace with the demand for Army & Navy manpower.

Confusion multiplied last week, and politics lent a hand to stir the confusion. The House Military Affairs Committee launched a bill forbidding induction of heads of families until all single men, all childless married men in each respective state had been called. A rider forbade induction by occupational groups, played hob with McNutt's plan to force nonessential workers into war industries.

From the Senate came another wrench in manpower planning. Alabama's John H. Bankhead drafted two bills to defer agricultural labor from the draft, force the release on furlough for farm work of Army men who had been farmers. Franklin Roosevelt made a countermove--suggested some use of soldiers in harvesting crops, volunteer harvesting by children.

It was plain that unless the Manpower Commission, the Army, the Navy and Congress could reach a meeting of minds on a clear-cut program, the U.S. faced a breakdown in war production and essential civilian economy.

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