The Expert Speaks

Last week the New York Times concluded the best series of reports yet written on the Pacific war. The reporter: 39-year-old Hanson W. Baldwin, who may well turn out to be the outstanding U.S. example of the commentator who serves his country and the armed services by directing intelligent criticism where it will do the most good.

Making of an Expert. Before September 1939, Hanson Baldwin had accumulated a solid reputation for sound reporting of naval affairs. Then he included the Army in his field. He wrote books (United We Stand, Strategy for Victory, The Caissons Roll, Admiral Death, What the Citizen Should Know About the Navy). After Dec. 7, he wrote a column of signed comment. His reputation grew.

Day after day, week after week, he sat in his cramped, cluttered office in New York and wrote about the Navy, the Army and the war. Occasionally he had a week or so at Army posts, or on a warship, living the life he knew when he was at Annapolis and a junior officer in the Navy (1924-27). But he was restless. He wanted to see the war.

Last August he set off on a tour of Hawaii, Palmyra, the Fijis, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, the Solomons. When he returned, he wrote eight analytical reports. By last week, when the Times published the final installment, Hanson Baldwin's stature as a military reporter and critic had enormously increased.

Disaster at Savo. Reporter Baldwin gave the blackest account yet printed of the naval disaster Aug. 9, in which three U.S. cruisers and one Australian cruiser were sunk (TIME, Oct. 19). "The Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes and Canberra . . . were surprised like sitting ducks; none of them had a chance to get off more than a few ineffectual salvos . . . despite the fact that one of our planes [had reported] the approach of the Japanese cruisers the afternoon prior to the night action. . . . They [the U.S. cruisers] had assumed a defensive position, patrolling over a fixed course in narrow waters and awaiting the enemy instead of going out to attack him. . . . Their dispositions enabled the enemy to approach almost within gun range without detection. . . . Only a small part of their crews were at battle stations. . . . The admiral in command of the northern cruiser screen had left the scene in his flagship. . . . The loss was . .. unnecessary."

Baldwin's account suggested that the blame for these and other losses did not belong exclusively to Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the area commander whom the Navy relieved last fortnight. Baldwin named no names, but he implied that inept, overtimid, task-force commanders may have been at least partly to blame. His major conclusion: "The Solomons have clearly shown deficiencies--which stem from overcaution and the defensive complex--that must be remedied. If mistakes continue, we can defeat ourselves."

Airpower at Sea. Fleet-minded Mr. Baldwin found the navy operating long-range, army-type heavy bombers from land bases, using its carrier-based dive-bombers, torpedo planes and scouting planes fully and skillfully, and the Army Air Forces cooperating closely and well at the fighting fronts. But: "We have not yet learned how to integrate the [naval] gun with the bomb and torpedo, how best to use surface ships with planes. . . . Neither the carrier alone nor the heavy bomber alone will win this war. Nor will airpower alone or seapower alone. . . . The lesson of the Pacific war is that no one arm or service is ever enough."

To Baldwin some of the admirals seemed to have acquired an exaggerated respect for airpower. "... Some commanders have been overimpressed with the effectiveness of airpower upon surface ships, and this has resulted in overcaution."

Divided Command. The nearer Hanson Baldwin got to the fighting front, the closer he found the cooperation between Army and Navy. At the top he found fairly close integration, with room for improvement. It was in the middle ranks, particularly among airmen, that he found the most recrimination and distrust. One reason: the Army's exaggerated reports on the role of Army bombers in the Battle of Midway (Baldwin: "The Navy's carriers did the job"). Baldwin saw Navy, Marine and Army men in almost identical khaki, working "in close harmony in combat areas," concluded: "There is no question that one uniform and one fighting service with a common tradition and a common interest are the answer to our defense problems. ... A separate air force would probably only serve to add friction. . . ."

Baldwin took due and disapproving note of the "arbitrary" geographical division of Pacific command between General MacArthur in Australia and Admiral Nimitz in the southwest Pacific (TIME, Nov. 2). Gentle though they were, Baldwin's understatements helped to needle Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson into declaring last week that the Solomons campaign was jointly planned in the map-walled room where the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet (see cut, p. 67). If so, collaboration in the early stages broke down somewhere between Washington and Guadalcanal. It was also clear that Army-Navy teamwork had improved in the later stages, was still improving (see p. 28).

Australia. Baldwin's only second-hand reports concerned Australia, which he did not visit. Wrote he: "Australia's internal problems have rendered MacArthur's position . . . difficult. . . . The importance of his coming and of the arrival of American troops to Australian politics is obvious. Prime Minister John Curtin's political position naturally was strengthened by these events. . . . The Australian War Cabinet naturally continued to reserve to itself a considerable share of authority. Military decisions in Australia and the adjacent area (i.e., New Guinea) have not always been General MacArthur's."

Baldwin also reported that Australian labor was loafing on its war job. Army Minister Francis Forde, Foreign Minister Herbert Evatt erupted, denounced Baldwin, denied his charges. General MacArthur, incidentally disowning any political ambitions (see p. 21), duly announced he had received the utmost cooperation. But informed observers judged Baldwin was not far wrong, guessed the recent improvement of news from New Guinea, including the Allies' recapture of the Jap base at Kokoda, was one sign that Douglas MacArthur was already solving some very serious internal problems. If this was true, Washington had one good reason (among a lot of bad ones) for dividing the Pacific command. The Navy, steering clear of General MacArthur, had also avoided his Australian complications.

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