People's Army

General Jose Fidel Davila, Defense Minister in the new Rightist Cabinet (see p. 17), ended a fortnight of cautious inaction on the Teruel front, launched an offensive 25 miles north of Teruel which this week swept forward at least 18 miles. In the ominous calm which preceded this fresh blast in Spain's storm, Britain's lanky No. 1 commentator on military affairs, famed Captain Basil Henry Liddell Hart, leaned back in a London armchair last week, pondered, then wrote his professional opinion--thoughtful if iffy--on the next six months of Spain's civil war:

"On the main front it is clear that Franco has a large superiority in aircraft and a considerable superiority in artillery. On the other hand the fighting spirit seems to be stronger on the Barcelona Government side as a whole, except for certain sections of Franco's troops, such as the Navarrese and what remains of the Foreign Legion. The Government also seems to have the superiority in motor transport, and this is very important militarily. Any greater result than an initial success in a surprised offensive depends on the rapidity with which attacker and defender can rush up reserves, to deepen or close the breach respectively. . . .

"Military balance might thus be regarded as inclining toward the Government. But that prospect is complicated by other factors, of which the most important are first, the food shortage from which the areas in Government possession are suffering, secondly, the wearying and exhausting effect of constant air raids on the civil population where there is a deficiency of means to check them.

"If Franco should win now it will in all probability be due to these factors. But if the food situation can be improved and the civil population can hold out under the strain, Franco's prospects may have definitely faded by the summer. Even so, the disappearance of Franco's hopes of victory would not necessarily mean the restoration of the Government's supremacy throughout Spain. Thus, if the Government can maintain its own food supplies, the most probable outcome would seem to be that the war may peter out with Spain divided into two parts more or less along the present battle line. If peace is thus restored, conflict might be expected to break out inside those parts, especially on Franco's side."

The new Army of Leftist Spain, thus shaded for the victory by Captain Hart, is as brilliantly unorthodox as some of the captain's own theories (he thinks the War's greatest general was T. E. Lawrence). Its history is the most exciting record of men at arms since the Russian Revolution. The outgrowth of one regiment, it owes its present effectiveness to the stress of one battle, the ability of one politician and a handful of generals, three of them Spanish.

Alphabet Militia. When, beginning July 17, 1936, Army garrisons all over Morocco and Spain revolted under their officers' orders, Leftist political groups in Spain were not entirely unprepared. Wiseacres had believed that civil war was inevitable ever since the February elections gave the Rightist parties a popular vote of 4,696,000 to the Leftists' 4,356,000, but, owing to Spain's peculiar electoral system, gave the Leftists control of the Government with 296 seats in Parliament to the Rightists' 177. The Rightists correctly assumed that over to them would go most troops of Spain's regular Army, but assorted Leftist political groups began drilling and equipping little armies or militias of their own: the C.N.T. (National Confederation of Labor); U.G.T. (General Union of Labor); F.A.I. (Iberian Anarchist Federation); the P.O.U.M. (United Marxist Party); etc., etc. Among the most colorful was the "Batallon de los Figaros," a battalion composed entirely of barbers and hairdressers which later did yeoman service. Two nights after the Rightists first rose in arms, new Leftist Premier Jose Giral opened the jails and distributed truckloads of rifles, handed out in the slums and factory districts of Madrid. The workers and released persons who thus were given arms, plus the "Alphabet Militias," were all there was to oppose Francisco Franco, who had with him 90% of Spain's Army officers and about 60,000 troops. Each Leftist militia had its own supply service, its own officers and stock of munitions and they cooperated with each other or not as the spirit moved them.

Fifth Regiment. Most efficient of all the Leftist militias was the Fifth Regiment, raised by the Communist Party in Madrid, and it was from that original block of 1,000 men that the present efficient People's Army of the Leftists has grown. Its development, described graphically by Leftist Volunteer Ralph Bates in the New Republic four months ago, was gradual. Other Madrilenos, in the frantic first days of the capital's defense, saw that the men of the Fifth Regiment were actually being drilled before being sent into the lines, that it seemed to have officers whose commands were obeyed, that its supplies arrived promptly. Volunteers hustled to join the Fifth. From the beginning of the war, the able organizers of the Fifth preached the necessity of a centralized Leftist Army under a "unified command." Despite its size the Fifth Regiment had not sufficient prestige to beat down the opposition of the Leftist Government's assorted politicians until Nov. 7, 1936, when Francisco Franco's armies were stopped at the very gates of Madrid.

Defense of the capital lay in the Fifth Regiment's hands. Few thought it could succeed, least of all the Leftist Cabinet, then headed by Socialist Extremist Francisco Largo Caballero. Packing up in haste, the Cabinet fled the capital secretly for Valencia, leaving official instructions for greying, amiable, Jose Miaja to defend Madrid or surrender as he thought best. At this point the Communist leaders of the Fifth Regiment issued a historic manifesto to all Madrid citizens telling them to build barricades in the streets, to fill bottles with gasoline for use as homemade incendiary bombs against tanks, to defend every street against the advancing Rightists.

Plump General Miaja's loyalty and honesty have never been questioned, but he is no genius. With him he had far more able Sebastian Pozas, one of the very few generals of Spain's regular army to support the Leftists instead of joining Franco* and as chief of staff he had Vicente Rojo Luich, whose open Left sympathies had kept him from a General's sash in the army of King Alfonso XIII but whose ability as a staff officer was widely recognized. The presence of these three men, plus the discovery of a copy of Franco's plan of attack in the pocket of a captured Rightist officer, plus the arrival of 2,000 foreign volunteers of the First International Brigade under General Emil Kleber turned the trick. Madrid was saved and, though the world credited the International volunteers, organized and dispatched to Spain by persons who concealed their identities, Spain credited the Fifth Regiment, which at that time totaled about 50,000 men. Soon afterward the Fifth Regiment disbanded itself to become the Army of the Centre with its three most important generals the three com manders at Madrid: Miaja, Pozas and Rojo.

Prieto. Best friend of the new Army is the Leftist Government's present Minister of Defense, bland, moon-faced Indalecio Prieto, onetime Basque newsboy, longtime Socialist politician. He could do little as long as his old political rival, vacillating Largo Caballero, remained Premier, heartily backed by Anarchists and Syndicalists whose chief interest is promoting in Spain the social revolution now going on amid the civil war. In May 1937, shrewd Indalecio Prieto, assisted by the Communists who are intent on winning the war first and letting the Revolution take care of itself, jockeyed and maneuvered Largo Cabailero into resigning. Serious, middle-of-the-roader Dr. Juan Negrin became Premier and frontman for Socialist Prieto, who received the key Ministry of National Defense.

Things instantly looked up for the new "People's Army," as it is called in Leftist Spain. The service of supplies and muni tions was overhauled ; the remnants of the unreliable old "alphabet militia" were taken out of the line and reorganized ; conscription was enforced throughout Leftist territory, bringing the Army up to nearly 800,000 men; and General Sebastian Pozas was sent to Barcelona with orders to get Catalonia into the war, soon earned the title of commander in chief on the Aragon front.

Pozas-The People's Army is still too new, and personal jealousies are still too tender, for it to accept an official Commander in Chief, but that in effect was what Sebastian Pozas became and is today. By early summer of 1937 it became evident that Madrid was impregnable to what forces El Caudillo Franco could then send against it, evident that his best chance to win the war would be a drive to the sea, separating Leftist industrial Barcelona from Valencia. Kindly, honest Jose Miaja was left in technical command at Madrid, but to the most crucial front went the People's Army's best general, Sebastian Pozas, with brilliant young Vicente Rojo as chief of staff.

Sixty-two years ago Sebastian Pozas was born in Navarre, the province of General Franco's best Spanish fighters, the ardently royalist Carlist monarchists. Pozas' brother, a Rightist officer, was reported killed in the same plane crash with Franco's right-hand man, famed General Emilio Mola (TIME, June 14). A cousin, General Gabriel Pozas, is also fighting in the Rightist ranks. Leftist Sebastian Pozas has never concealed his disgust at Anarchists and other Leftist terrorists, did his best to suppress Leftist murder squads in Madrid in the earliest, bloodiest days of the war. In Morocco twelve years ago he and Francisco Franco were good friends, at a time when Franco and Miaja could not stand the sight of each other. On the Aragon front since last May, General Pozas has been able to: 1) bring the recalcitrant Catalans into the fight, 2) capture Belchite, and 3) hand over to his subordinate, General Rojo, the successfully prepared offensive which spectacularly took Teruel (TIME, Jan. 10, et seq.).

The People's Army now headed by General Pozas still lacks sufficient planes, heavy artillery and junior officers, but it has a unified organization, uniforms, better food than the civilians of Madrid or Valencia, at least five weeks' training of recruits before going into the lines (six months for officers) and a basic pay of ten pesetas a day (60-c-). Three pesetas was the average pay of Spanish farm hands before the civil war. Leftist Spain confidently faces the new year with a new army.

Stalin's Generals. Not so confusing as it at first appears is the fact that Spanish Communists and the Soviet officials assisting them are doing everything in their power to prevent Leftist Spain from going too Red. Communism, by Steel Man Stalin's present definition, is primarily for Russian consumption. A Fascist Spain would be a tragedy for Moscow, but alienating France and Britain would be a tragedy too. To suit Stalin, the social revolution in Spain must wait or move slowly until threats of war to the Soviet Union from Germany and Japan are ended. Among the busiest of Russians in Leftist Spain are the secret agents of its Gay-Pay-Oo, whose job is ferreting out and suppressing troublesome Trotskyists.

The experienced generals from Russia, who have played a much greater part in the victories of the People's Army than the 5,000-odd Soviet Red Army soldiers now in Spain, are changed every few months, operate mostly under false names, keep in the background as much as possible. Many have not been of Russian nationality, one is known to have remarked with a grin, "I have five perfectly valid passports, one American." Veteran New York Times Correspondent Herbert L. Matthews names as non-Spanish Leftist Generals Kleber, Lukacs. De Gorieff (also called Van Rosen), Gall, Walter and an anti-Nazi German , General so leery lest his real name be found out that he is called only by the common Christian name of "Hans."

Correspondent Matthews relates in his Two Wars and. More to Come what efforts the Leftists make to have their offensives as Spanish as possible, records an instance in which he correctly deduced that a Leftist offensive was failing because only one day after it got going he found that a Russian general had already arrived at Leftist staff headquarters.

*In July 1936 Spain's Army counted 100,000 men, 22,000 officers, 875 generals.

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