Political Turning?

To citizens not politically minded, Franklin Roosevelt is still what he became on March 5, 1933 the night of his first fireside talk: "our beloved President," Franklin the Good. To political realists, who try to regard him as a man and a maker of policies, he has given one shock after another, upsetting all attempts to identify him. In spring 1933 (banking crisis) they labeled him Man of the Hour. In summer 1933 (Economy Act, NRA) they relabeled him Man of Recovery. In autumn and winter 1933-34 (dollar devaluation; spending program) they relabeled him Man of Experiment. In the spring of 1934 (banking reforms; Brain Trust ascendancy) they relabeled him Man of Reform. Finally they began to record "swings to the right," "swings to the left" until many a weary observer gave up, declared Franklin Roosevelt a creature of ephemeral enthusiasm, of extemporaneous opportunism. For the first time in months this cynicism has cracked.

Last week some observers not only warmed to the belief but became outspoken advocates of the proposition that Franklin Roosevelt had adopted an unheralded but consistent policy, that under the very noses of doubters he had already put his policy into effect. They made a blunt assertion:

Franklin Roosevelt had looked at his twin objectives, Recovery and Reform, and changed his mind about which of them was underprivileged. For many months he had lavished his care on Reform believing that Recovery, with all the advantages he had planned for it, must inevitably grow. But seeing it still lagging after nearly two years' time he realized that the advantages given Recovery by its nurse, the Government, were not enough. He must after all rely on its parent, Business, to look after it. Early this winter Donald Richberg and the President's chief advisors were given to understand that Business was to be encouraged and not squelched when it approached the nursery. That understanding is still in force.

To support this bald statement, its makers last week had a notable case, citing chapter and verse from Administration acts:

1) The President's outright support of the publishers against Labor and his own Labor Board in the case of Dean Jennings, rewrite man fired by Hearst's San Francisco Call-Bulletin (TIME, Feb. 4).

2) His renewal of the Automobile Code contrary to the wishes of the A. F. of L. followed by his blunt rebuff of A. F. of L. protests.

3) His firm stand by NRAdministrator S. Clay Williams, tobacco tycoon, over the protests of William Green.

4) His social security program, falling far short of radical desires.

5) His proposal that under his $4,000,000,000 work relief program, relief wages should be well below prevailing wages in industry so as not to compete with business for the services of labor.

6) The encouragement given to Secretary Roper's Business Advisory and Planning Council--a council in existence for a year and a half but whose members only in recent weeks have been allowed to speak confidentially into influential ears.

7) Most striking of all. the cool ousting or demotions of Jerome Frank, Frederick Howe and a bevy of lesser Brain

Trusters from AAA, a dismissal the more pointed because its reason was undisguised: a disagreement over policies in which the radicals were ousted.

The case made out for this deliberate turn of policy even included the exception-that-proves-the-rule: the President's determination to attack holding companies.

Even the motivation of the policy could be outlined by inference:

The first two years of the New Deal were, from an economic point of view, no smashing success. NRA, AAA, $4,000,000,000 a year in emergency expenditures, dollar devaluation, all had been tried but some 5,000,000 families still remained on relief. The Government's financial credit could not stand such a strain indefinitely. Nor could the Administration's political credit. A new economic order might be set up by a five-year or a ten-year plan, but certainly not by an 18-month plan. And the campaign of 1936 is not more than 18 months ahead. If there is not recovery in 18 months then radicals will storm at the ivory gates of the Capitol. The Huey Longs, the Upton Sinclairs, the Father Coughlins, the Dr. Townsends-- their successors, their deputies, their proselytes, or their social kin--will be the strong men of politics. Only Recovery can ward them off, can save Franklin Roosevelt from having his left flank turned. Therefore a helping hand to Business and Recovery, more leisurely advancement for Reform. Thus, last week, the pundits.

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