Disgust

Around the bulky form of Ohio's rich, jovial James Middleton Cox the first big battle of the World Monetary and Economic Conference was fought last week and won.

"This American, this M. Cox--what do you call him?" European delegates wanted to know. Settling the question Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald, President of the Conference, dubbed Mr. Cox, "The Governor."* Promptly he became "Le Gouverneur" to polite but stubborn Frenchmen who made up their minds that M. Cox was not going to chair man the Conference Monetary Committee, first and most important to be formed as 66 nations got down to business last week. France, as the sole Great Power still on the gold standard, felt that her Finance Minister, knife-featured little Georges Bonnet, was the logical, the only choice.

"Long before we sailed the American Delegation was promised this chairman ship," declared Chief U. S. Delegate Cordell Hull, who must soon return to Washington, leaving Vice-Chief Delegate Cox in London as the No. 1 U. S. Delegate.

Followed four hectic days of lobbying with France in a repulsing mood and Britain lukewarm to "The Governor." In a spat direct Candidate Bonnet said to Candidate Cox: "With Washington committed to devaluation we cannot have an American as monetary chairman!"

"With Paris committed to repudiation," retorted Candidate Cox, referring to the French debt default, "we cannot have a Frenchman!"

Surprisingly after this clash M. Bonnet and Le Gouverneur managed to reach agreement. Fiscal experts of the U. S., British and French delegations paved the way to peace among their chiefs by deciding that, in their opinion, it should be possible promptly to peg the dollar, the pound, the franc. Since this was the main thing France wanted, M. Bonnet was soon exclaiming "We love Le Gouverneur !"

Mr. Cox, asked by a correspondent whether the dollar was being pegged at $4 to the pound, replied "That guess would shoot very close to the mark."

Shortly after Le Gouverneur was elected Monetary Chairman unanimously, even M. Bonnet voting for him. Said Chairman Cox: "I have always favored a sound monetary policy. I have had important conversations with Finance Minister Bonnet which have made me certain there is no essential divergence of our views in regard to restoring financial and monetary order in the world."

Since M. Bonnet and French Premier Edouard Daladier are the stiffest of gold standard twins, Wall Street understood Chairman Cox to mean that President Roosevelt had definitely decided not to resort to inflation, at least during the Conference. Promptly, on the theory that dollars, if sound, are not a bad investment, Wall Street sold stocks & commodities, caused their prices to decline. Alarmed, Secretary of the Treasury Woodin declared in Washington that the U. S. Delegation could not have agreed in London to even tentative dollar stabilization. This restored uncertainty--a bull point in WalI Street--and prices firmed. But in London the fury of Frenchmen knew no bounds. Le Gouverneur, they thought, had tricked the Conference to win his Monetary Chairmanship.

London's impression that the U. S.. British and French experts had reached virtual agreement on stabilization before Secretary Woodin interfered was confirmed when President Roosevelt received a 13-page cabled memorandum from Expert Dr. Oliver M. W. Sprague, financial adviser to the U. S. Treasury, one-time adviser to the Bank of England. The memorandum, U. S. treasury officials said, proposed a method of dollar stabilization for the duration of the Conference. This method the President emphatically rejected after studying the Sprague memorandum with Secretary Woodin. At the Treasury correspondents were told that fresh instructions had been cabled to the U. S. Delegation. "Certainly we all realize the importance of currency stabilization," said Undersecretary of the Treasury Dean Acheson, "but we do not wish to say that any currency should be pegged at the present levels or any certain level. We just have not arrived at a place where we can pick out a particular point where stabilization should take place."

In London that night Undersecretary Acheson's statement blew up a champagne night club party attended by M. Bonnet. Summoned by their Finance Minister angry French delegates, all in full evening dress, met for a midnight indignation conference. "France will refuse to participate at the Conference," said an irate French Delegation spokesman, "until the dollar and pound are stable!"

By morning French heads were cooler. The Conference did not break down. But all London buzzed with questions over the hopeless U. S. money muddle. What, in the name of common sense, could President Roosevelt mean? Did not he and everyone else know that nothing can be done at the Conference without some sort of monetary agreement? Was the President an avowed supporter of the Conference, double-crossing the world? Explanations in London last week revolved around the following analysis:

The biggest stick held today by Franklin Delano Roosevelt is potential inflation. This horseshoe of fear domestic and foreign, the President clutched last week as a lucky talisman. The business of the Conference, he seemed to feel, is to proceed with other matters, such as tariffs-- even though tariffs are based on prices, which are based on money and must therefore fluctuate until money is stabilized.

Tariffs were handed over during the week to the Conference's second great working body, the Economic Commission. Grave, punctilious Dr. Hendrikus Colijn, Premier of the Netherlands, was elected chairman. The committee promptly took up a proposal that every tariff in all the World be cut 10% which the Conference Secretariat had released on a mimeographed sheet with the head: "Submitted by the American Delegation." Suddenly, to the utter amazement of Chairman Colijn, this proposal was disavowed by U. S. Delegate Senator Key Pittman. The U. S. Delegation, he said, had made no such proposal. Perhaps one of its experts had but that made no difference.

Piqued, the Conference Secretariat produced a letter signed by Chief U. S. Delegate Cordell Hull apparently authorizing the 10% tariff slash proposal. Faced with this, Senator Pittman insisted that it was "unofficial." To a Dutchman a signature is final. Chairman Colijn told the Economic Committee that the U. S. proposal had been made, left the entire Conference up in the air as to what Washington's tariff policy might be, if any.

In a move to force definite proposals of some sort from the U. S. Delegation, Continental delegates led by the French loudly voiced their disgust, proposed in the Conference lobbies: "Let us adjourn the World Conference for six weeks until the Americans make up their minds!"

--He was thrice Governor of Ohio before running for President with Franklin I). Roosevelt as his Vice-Presidential running mate.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.