Accord de Confiance

INTERNATIONAL

Sir John Allsebrook Simon is tall, bland, very British. The breadth of his shoulders is accentuated by a neck long yet not too long. Smooth and pink, the face of his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs takes on at will an innocent, babyish expression, flashes his "lightning smile" or congeals into withering hauteur. Throughout the Empire "John," as his few intimates call him, is famed as Britain's most highly remunerated barrister. Slow in walk and gesture he is lightning quick of mind and he is tireless. Last week he became Chairman of the League of Nations preparatory commission which will organize and stage the World Economic Conference at which the Allies will ask the U. S. to cancel or reduce their War Debts.

"Mutual Contribution" Sir John began the week in London, whither he had come from the Lausanne Conference which authorized the League to stage the World Conference. In London the Press was buzzing with the Lausanne agreement proper and its supplementary "gentleman's agreement" (TIME, July 18). Rising to address the House of Commons. Sir John announced the existence of a third agreement or Accord de Con fiance between the French Government and His Majesty's.

Since the Accord de Con fiance soon provoked last week an indignant blast from President Hoover and since Le Temps of Paris called it "the most important international act in recent world history," observers scrutinized the full text:

"In the declaration which forms part of the Final Act of the Lausanne Conference the signatory powers express how the task there accomplished will be followed by fresh achievements. They affirm further that success will be more readily won if the nations will rally to a new effort in the cause of peace, which can only be complete if it is applied in both the economic and political spheres. In the same document the signatory powers declare their intention to make every effort to resolve the problems which exist at the present moment or may arise subsequently in the spirit which has inspired the Lausanne agreement. In that spirit His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and the French Government decided themselves to give the lead in making an immediate mutual contribution to that end on the following lines:

"First, in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations they intend to exchange views with one another with complete candor concerning, and to keep each other mutually informed of, any questions coming to their notice similar in origin to that now so happily settled at Lausanne which may affect the European regime. It is their hope that other governments will join them in adopting their procedure.

"Secondly, they intend to work together and with the other delegations at Geneva to find a solution for the disarmament question which will be beneficial and equitable for all the powers concerned.

"Thirdly, they will cooperate with each other and other interested governments in careful and practical preparation of the World Economic Conference.

"Fourthly, pending negotiation at a later date of a new commercial treaty between their two countries, they will avoid any action in the nature of discrimination by one country against the interests of the other."

Nailed to the Mast! From Paris the Havas Agency, semi-official mouthpiece of the French Government, cabled throughout the world that Premier Herriot, reporting officially to a committee of the Chamber of Deputies last week, said:

"The immediate consequence of the new pact will be that Britain cannot, as in 1923, undertake to make payments to the United States for settlement of debts without previously consulting the French Government. The certainty of a concerted attitude is henceforth an accomplished fact which will facilitate success in negotiations with Washington."

In London this Havas dispatch so excited Prime Minister MacDonald that he called Premier Herriot on the trans-Channel telephone and begged him to retract.

Scot MacDonald's excitement was due, of course, to his realization of the effect which the Havas dispatch would and did quickly produce on President Hoover and U. S. public opinion. Havas retracted not one word. M. Herriot obligingly declared that he had been "misunderstood," adding that he meant what he originally said but was referring not to the Accord de Confiance but to the gentleman's agreement. Two days later sword-handy Senator Henry Berenger, who negotiated the Franco-U. S. debt settlement (TIME, May 10, 1926) and is today Chairman of the French Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote in the Paris newspaper of the Agence Economique et Financiere:

"No matter what is treated--debts, reparations, disarmament, security, credits, moneys, production, exchanges, tariffs, transports--in one word, peace and civili-zation--England and France engage themselves to prepare joint solutions."

This confirmed Havas and undoubtedly represented the real views of the French Government last week. L' Ere Nouvelle, personal organ of Premier Herriot, exulted: "The Accord de Con fiance constitutes on the same basis as the Locarno and Briand-Kellogg pacts one of the most important political events on an international scale since Versailles!"

No Truth? Thus France nailed again & again to the mast her understanding that united Franco-British pressure will be brought to bear on the U. S. to cancel War Debts. The French attitude only hardened under President Hoover's blast against such pressure and under the following observation soon made by Scot MacDonald:

"There is no truth in any statement that the Anglo-French declaration [Accord de Confiance] is applicable to the question of British debts to the U. S. The use in the declaration of the words 'European regime' expressly excludes from its purview any questions affecting the non-European countries."

Privately French officials called this British statement a mass of weasel words uttered to impress U. S. public opinion but contrary to the letter of the Accord de Con fiance which Britain signed. What Europe owes, they asserted, most certainly "affects the European regime" and is therefore explicitly included in (not excluded from) the purview of the Accord de Con fiance.

Berlin's Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung took a similar view, denounced Anglo-French secret diplomacy and asked, "What is the use to us of the true blue eyes of English statesmen and their protestations? In the end England and France have always got together and we were the dupes."

Simon v. Davis, Meanwhile Sir John Allsebrook Simon had flown from London to Geneva. As he entered the Hotel des Bergues he was pounced upon by Norman H. Davis, U. S. Delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, who angrily protested assertions in the House of Commons by Chancellor of the Exchequer Chamberlain giving the impression that the U. S. Disarmament Delegates had been consulted about the various Lausanne agreements and had tacitly approved them.

With Sir John's pink face a mask of innocence, Mr. Davis hotly declared: 1) that the U. S. Delegates had refused to speak officially about debts to the British; 2) that they had refused to speak unofficially; 3) that when entreated by the British to give at least their private opinion on the attitude which U. S. public opinion, Congress or the President might be expected to take toward the Lausanne program* they had advised the British against taking any step resembling the gentleman's agreement or the Accord de Confiance.

Mr. Davis' words amounted to an accusation of bad faith on the part of His Majesty's Government in general and on the part of Chancellor Chamberlain in particular. Not one bit abashed Sir John displayed his "lightning smile," called in correspondents and told them that in what Mr. Chamberlain said to the House of Commons he had been "misunderstood."

"He did not suggest," said Sir John, "and of course had no intention of suggesting that the representatives of the United States had approved, either tacitly or explicitly, what was done at Lausanne."

The U. S. delegation, having obtained this flat British retraction, could do no more. When Chief U. S. Delegate Hugh S. Gibson again tried to get favorable action on President Hoover's proposal of Disarmament-By-One-Third (TIME, July 4), he was blocked by the French and British Delegations, as before. On the important disarmament issue a Franco-British "united front" was seen definitely to exist.

Soviet Russia alone came forward last week to support President Hoover's proposal (Italy and certain minor nations having already done so). Cried big, bearish Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, "My government will accept no resolution terminating this Conference which does not embody the principle of one-third reduction of arms!"

Simon Steamroller. Next day the League Council met and chose Sir John Simon to manage preparations for the Economic Conference.

In vain Spanish Ambassador Salvador de Madariaga protested that the Lausanne Conference seemed to be "dictating" to the League Council. With glacial courtesy Sir John called the Spaniard "the watchdog of the constitutional rights and powers of the League," then steamrollered his own program through the Council, thus making himself Chairman of the Preparatory Commission.

This was done, according to Correspondent Clarence K. Streit of the New York Times, "in a manner domineering enough to incense the small countries."

Significance. What did all this mean?

Realistically viewed, the Reparations and War Debts situation rests on a foundation far broader than mere statecraft. Pressure upon the U. S. (if it is exerted); scurvy tricks (if they are played at the World Economic Conference); the refusal of the U. S. Congress to cancel another cent (if it refuses)--none of these things alter what are probably the paramount facts: 11 that the U. S. will not fight to collect from the Allies; 2) that the Allies will pay the U. S. proportionately no more than they receive from Germany*; 3) that the German people believe they cannot pay and are determined that they will not pay even the sum of 1-c- on the $1 of their Reparations debt envisioned in the Lausanne settlement./-

Taking a long view, it seemed probable that Reparations and War Debts are already over the dam and that U. S. taxpayers will bear the ultimate burden, to be imposed by cancellation or default as the case may be. This should permit Germany to repay her private debts to foreigners (largely U. S. citizens) both as to principal and interest.

*The program: a moratorium to be followed by virtual cancellation of what Germany owes the Allies if the Allies obtain virtual cancellation of what they owe to the U. S.

*Heckled as to the exact meaning of the Lausanne settlement, gentleman's agreement and Accord de Confiance last week Premier Herriot told the Chamber flatly: "They mean that Frenchmen cannot be asked to pay more than they receive!"

/- In London last week Sir Walter Thomas Layton, director of the Economic & Financial Section of the League and a delegate to the Lausanne Conference said that the accords "put an end to Reparations." Herr Hitler has declared that the accords "will not be worth more than three marks (71c) in six months" (TIME, July 18).

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