Treaty Debate: First Week

Treaty Debate: First Week

(See front cover) The London Naval Treaty lay motionless in docket during the first week of the special session of the Senate called to consider it. Gales of oratory blew but they were a preliminary storm designed to delay the Treaty's start towards ratification. Only two formal speeches on the Treaty itself, one for, one against, were made in the first five days of debate.

"Secret Documents." President Hoover's message on the Treaty had hardly been read before Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, Democrat, was on his feet with a resolution requesting the President to submit to the Senate "all letters, cablegrams, minutes, memoranda, instructions, despatches, records, files and other information" relative to the Treaty. This question of "Secret Documents" had already been thrashed out between the anti-Treaty members of the Foreign Relations Committee and the President, who had explained the papers desired and withheld were not solely U. S. property but belonged also to the other countries negotiating (TIME, June 16 et seq.). But now the whole Senate was urged to consider, to defend its constitutional power and privilege as a treaty-maker co-equal with the President.

Pennsylvania's David Aiken Reed, U. S. S.,-- was first to the defense of the Administration for withholding the documents. As the Republican Senatorial delegate to the London Conference, he was Treaty's spearhead of defense in the Senate, its chief exponent on the floor. At London his part had been negotiation of the Japanese-American aspect of the Treaty, the aspect most alarming to white-crested Senator Hiram Johnson of California, chief Treaty opponent. From London last April Senator Reed broadcast a speech in which he said: "The Treaty represents a victory for no one nation. A great deal of rubbish has been talked about international relation and friendliness but I think it is not rubbish to claim that this Treaty means much for the preservation of friendly and peaceful relationships." When as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee" he heard U. S. admirals and others criticize the Treaty, he pounded the table, grew sarcastic, employed the police-court tactics of Senator Caraway of the Senate Lobby Committee and let all anti-Treaty witnesses know that he considered their testimony "rubbish." He did not say "rubbish" to his opponents in the Senate last week, but he let them know distinctly that was what he thought of their views and tactics.

Senator Reed explained that he had in his office copies of all the data his curious colleagues wanted, given him in confidence as a conference delegate. He would, he said, "be very glad to show the correspondence to any Senator who will accept it in the confidence in which I accepted it."

Up rose Senator Johnson to thunder: "I scorn that proposition! ... I demand, sir ... the right to see those documents and to utilize them in debate. . . . Here is a Treaty perhaps not very greatly opposed on the floor of the Senate, but thank God, it is opposed by some men who believe it is inimical and are willing in the face of press bludgeoning and partisan lashing to stand here and make them fight. . . ."

Senator Johnson and his cohorts spread the suspicion that the secret papers contained some sinister bargain which the Administration was afraid to reveal. Senator Joseph Taylor Robinson, of Arkansas, Senate minority leader and Democratic delegate to the London Conference, proposed to qualify the McKellar resolution by requesting the confidential papers only "if not incompatible with the public interest." Familiar with their contents, he declared: "The whole discussion is a tempest in a teapot. . . . They [the papers] are absolutely trivial and insignificant so far as they reflect any light on the Treaty. ... If they were ever published they would make us appear absolutely ridiculous and they might make some other people ridiculous for withholding them. . . ."

Dodo So-&-So. Against the opposition's clamor, Senator Reed began to make more specific explanations: "Now, an appeal to the horse sense of the Senate. When the American delegates to the London Conference were named, the British, Japanese, Italian and French Ambassadors undoubtedly reported back to their Governments the character of the delegates. It is open to assume that communications of this character were likewise made by Ambassador Dawes. He might have said: 'Sir What's His Name Snooks is a very shrewd man. He deals very closely and has to be watched,' or: 'Count Antonio This or That cannot be trusted,' or: 'Mr. So-and-so is an old dodo.' "

Mindful of Ambassador Dawes's use of strong language, Senators immediately got the idea that the documents would make racy personal reading, called for them louder than ever. Reports spread that Ambassador Dawes had characterized one British proposal as "damned nonsense," that Secretary of State Stimson had referred to certain U. S. Senators as "pin-heads." Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, a Treaty proponent, insisted, however, that he had read the secret documents and had "had a hard time keeping awake."

Laird of Stanmore. Senator George Higgins Moses of New Hampshire, opposing the Treaty, suggested that Senator Reed was "wrongfully in possession of these papers," advised him to return them to the State Department. When Senator Moses refused to look at the documents in Senator Reed's office. Senator Reed declared : "I can arrange to have the Secretary of State, with an armed escort, if necessary, present the papers to the Senator with all the formality necessary."

Retorted Senator Moses: "Oh, no. I would not put the Laird of Stanmore-- to that inconvenience."

Vote; Veto. After four days debate on the Senate's right to see the papers, the Robinson amendment was attached to the McKellar resolution (38-17) which was then adopted (53-4). President Hoover promptly refused to submit the papers to the Senate, reiterating the rights of other nations as his reason.

Results. Two pro-Treaty Senators-- Pittman of Nevada and Thomas of Oklahoma--now came out against the Pact. Senator Norris of Nebraska, a Treaty proponent, presented a reservation which declared the Senate approved the instrument "with the distinct and explicit understanding that there are no secret files, documents, letters, understandings or agreements which modify, change, add to or take from any of the stipulations, agreements or statements in said Treaty." Pro-Treaty Senators, infuriated at this reservation, declared it was "an insulting affront to President Hoover." The Treaty's foes, seizing upon the Norris reservation as a good means of killing more time, declared it was simply a reiteration of the President's own declarations.

First Formal Speech in behalf of the Treaty was delivered by a Democrat, Senator Claude Swanson of Virginia, minority chief of the Foreign Relations Committee. As Senator Swanson read from his manuscript, Secretary of State Stimson suddenly appeared on the Senate floor. He popped in and out of cloakrooms, held whispered confabs with pro-Treaty Senators, appeared busy and excited. Some observers thought he was on hand to direct the Treaty fight over the heads of Senators Reed and Robinson, but he explained that his presence was merely a "slight compliment" to Senator Swanson during his speech.

Arguing for ratification, Senator Swanson declared: "If credit is due for the London Treaty, it is due those who supported the 15-cruiser bill which provided for real cruisers and not blue prints, since this action created a desire in others for a limitation conference with the U. S. . . . This [limitation of capital ships until 1937] is the most admirable and commendable part of the Treaty. . . . The amount of tonnage [three 10,000-ton cruisers] involved ... is so small when compared with the very large fleets in which it is included that they are not of such vital importance as to justify the rejection of this Treaty. ... I regret that it was necessary to include the [escalator provision whereby tonnages could be upped]. ... I do not believe this privilege [of upping tonnage] will be abused or rarely if ever exercised. A nation would be very loath to state it needed new craft to meet the menace of another nation. ... I do not believe there will be any new construction under this article. . . . While it is to be deplored that it was included in the Treaty and while it prevents a complete limitation of armaments, it is not of sufficient serious import to justify the rejection of the Treaty. . . . From a military and selfish standpoint the U. S. cannot afford to reject this Treaty. From a higher and nobler purpose the Treaty should have an approval."

Opposition to the Treaty came in a three-hour speech by Republican Senator Frederick Hale, chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee. Excerpts:

"People do not understand this very intricate Treaty. They don't realize what we're giving up. . . . The Treaty gives to Japan, in return for no consideration whatever, a substantial increase over the ratio and still leaves us under the handicap not further to fortify our island bases in the Western Pacific. ... In the event of hostilities with Japan, we shall be forced to engage on less than even terms. . . . Much worse than the acceptance of reduction in our quota of 8-in. gun cruisers is the abandonment of the basic principle that each country shall have the right within the limitations of a category to build the type of ship it considers essential. By the acceptance of the British contention that parity shall be fleet combat parity alone, we place ourselves at an immense disadvantage. . . . The British have us hamstrung and hog-tied and there they will keep us as long as limitations of armaments are the order of the day.

"Under the Treaty we attempt to purchase the goodwill of the world through the sacrifice of the rights to safeguard our interests. We will get no goodwill but the contempt that a supine nation deserves to get. . . .'

"Fat Man." Aroused by Senator Hale's attack, Senator Reed broke out extemporaneously :

"I have never yet been at a ball game but I found at least one fat man in the bleachers who could play ball better than any player on the team! I never yet have seen a war in which belligerent civilians sitting in safety at home did not want an attack every morning. "If the black doctrine enunciated by the Senator from Maine, that the only adequate defense means mastery of the seas, then all conferences are useless and we had better go forth to shoot our way to a mastery of the seven seas.

" Quorum? Of greatest concern to Senate leaders as the second week of the Treaty fight began was keeping 49 Senators--a quorum--on hand. If the number dropped below that figure, the Treaty's opponents could obstruct all progress by demanding an adjournment. During the first week Senate attendance often was close to the line. Senators lukewarm on the Treaty departed from Washington-- Senators Cutting of New Mexico and Grundy of Pennsylvania for a vacation in Europe; Senator Nye of North Dakota to Illinois to investigate campaign expenditures; Senator Hayden to his home in Arizona. Four Senators were in London as delegates to the Interparliamentary Union meeting. As the quorum problem grew greater, Senator Moses claimed growing strength for the forces of delay and opposition, prophesied that at least 23 votes--which would require 46 votes to beat them--would be cast against the Treaty unless the Norris reservation was adopted.

-- Members of the Senate do not sign themselves "Senator." Instead they sign U. S. S. (United States Senator) at the end of their name. Representatives use M. C. (Member of Congress). These designations are required on their postal franks. --Statesman Stirnson rented Stanmore Castle outside London during the conference.

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