Treaty Maltreated

On the floor of the U. S. Senate last week stood Senator William Edgar Borah, fighting-man from Idaho. The business before the Senate was the ratification of the Kellogg peace treaty, already signed by some 60 of the world's nations. As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Borah had steered it through legislative tangles, had secured for it the right of way over the Cruiser Bill (see col. 2). Crowds gathered in the galleries; political correspondents prepared to hear and to record history. The Kellogg treaty was ready to go over in bursts of Borahtorical splendor.

Yet as the debate progressed, as its first day wore into its second and its second into its third, Senator Borah's position appeared to grow hourly more on the defensive. The bill was being "pounded," the Senator was being "heckled," the "treaty foes" were "hurling" questions, suggestions, criticisms. The Senator passed from the oratorical into the conversational; galleries and stenographers strained ears to catch low-toned thrusts and parries. Relatively in the background remained Senator Reed of Missouri, big anti-treaty gun still to be shot off. Meanwhile Bruce of Maryland, Johnson of California, Robinson of Indiana, Bingham of Connecticut, many another smaller gun popped, snapped, sputtered. The Senator from Idaho began somewhat to resemble an Horatius at the bridge, a Leonidas at Thermopylae. It was a sham battle, inasmuch as there existed an almost universal opinion that the treaty would easily collect its necessary two-thirds vote. Nevertheless, Senator Borah's partners remained silent partners; Senator Borah was sharply badgered, the treaty severely peppered.

The Treaty. Frequent discussion has made the main terms of the treaty familiar enough--by it the signatory powers "condemn recourse to war" and "renounce it as an instrument of national policy." They agree also to settle disputes "by pacific means." Furthermore, as Senator Borah stated last week, as Secretary Kellogg has previously said before the Foreign Relations Committee, the treaty should not be regarded as affecting in any manner the right of any signatory to go to war in what it considers self-defense.

No Compulsion. Inasmuch as virtually all modern wars are theoretically wars of self-defense, the question immediately arose as to what would prevent a war between two nations, each going to battle under a self-defense plea. Senator Borah admitted that the treaty in no way prevented such a possibility. "A nation must answer to the tribunal of public opinion as to her right to go to war," said he. "The only censor of her action is the power of public opinion."

Senator Hiram Johnson of California referred to the Spanish War, asked whether the U. S. could have gone to war over the Maine had the Kellogg Pact been in effect in 1898. Senator Borah replied that the U. S. could then have gone to war, since its ship had been blown up, its sailors killed.

"Rather sentimental reasons dictated the Spanish-American war, did they not?" asked Connecticut's Bingham.

"Well, I suspect that those reasons did enter into it," said Senator Borah. "I should hope that if we sign this treaty we would be more vigilant in confining ourselves to actual attack and not sentimental attacks."

Senator Bingham also asked whether, under the treaty, the U. S. could have sent an expedition into Mexico under General Pershing.

"I would not say as to any particular transaction," replied Senator Borah, "but ... we would have a perfect right to send an expedition anywhere, whether into Mexico or China ... to protect the lives and property of our citizens against actual threatened attack."

When Minnesota's Shipstead asked how the Kellogg treaty could have prevented the World War, Senator Borah answered that he did not know how it could have. In effect, he fell back on the moral and educational aspects of the treaty, said that in so far as the treaty's failure to control "self-defensive" wars might be a "weakness," such a "weakness" was "inherent in human nature."

Monroe Doctrine. Opponents of the treaty wish to incorporate in it a specific statement that the Monroe Doctrine is not affected by the agreement. Senator Borah said that the Monroe Doctrine was included in the right of self-defense. Senator Johnson said that if the treaty did not affect the Monroe Doctrine, what harm would there be in putting in a definite statement that the Monroe Doctrine was not involved? Senator Borah weasled.

The Senator was somewhat disturbed when Senator Glass asked him what would happen, under the treaty, if the League of Nations took coercive measures to settle the Paraguay-Bolivian dispute. He ran his hands through his hair, hesitated, said that he did not think the U. S. could intervene provided the League did not attempt to overthrow the Paraguayan or Bolivian governments. He added, however, that European governments had previously used force in South America without U. S. objection, and that what ever we could do in South America with out the treaty we could continue to do with the treaty. This last statement was typical of the entire debate, the strategy of which consisted chiefly in asking Sena tor Borah hypothetical questions about what would or would not happen, according to the treaty, in various assumed cases of international complications. Inasmuch as other signatories would presumably be equally unhandicapped, the treaty's value as a war-preventative became entirely shadowy.

British Monroe Doctrine. Advocates of treaty reservations point out that sev eral of the signatories have already sharply defined their individual attitudes regarding the agreement's scope and meaning. Great Britain, for example, has issued (TIME, July 30) a very sweeping statement that her right to self-defense includes the right to take whatever measures ap pear necessary in whatever portion of the world British safety may be threatened. Senator Borah said that the Chamberlain note meant nothing at all, inasmuch as it guaranteed to Great Britain nothing that was not already implicit in the treaty.

Thus the debate, with Senator Borah's defense easily twisted into an admission that the treaty did not mean very much of anything anyhow. Meanwhile the fact remained that the treaty would, in all probability pass the Senate, and the prevailing opinion seemed to be that no reservations would be attached to it. Mr. Borah may come out, however, not so much with an instrument that "outlaws war" as with a guarded and general international announcement that war is an extremely deplorable weapon to be used only when a nation really feels it must.