Historical Data

THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE--Arranged as a Narrative by Charles Seymour (Vol. Ill--Into the World War; Vol. IV--The Ending of the War)--Houghton Mifflin ($10).

The Inside Story. "There will be no war," said Wilson to House in January, 1917. Three months later, the same resolute energy he had expended on maintaining the peace, was doggedly diverted to the pursuit of war. The die cast, Wilson was out to win, and not so much a military victory as a moral conquest of internationalism over autocratic nationalism. But the tangible military victory being prerequisite to the moral conquest, Wilson passionately concerned himself with such tangibles as gold, food, fighting men. And lest he or his people flag, Balfour was sent over, a French mission was sent over, to emphasize the terrific need, to encourage, goad, inspire.

But the great historic significance of Balfour's visit was the fact--now first indisputably established by the evidence of the House papers--that Wilson was made fully aware of the secret treaties upon which, rather than upon Wilson's ideal, the ultimate Peace Treaty was virtually based. Wilson's 1917 decision, fortified if not formulated by Colonel House, was that any discussion of the treaties would lead to a disagreement among the allies, and hence play into the hand of the enemy. Anyway, Wilson was sure that U. S. economic power was such that "when the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking." At such naivete, or was it conceit?, how Balfour must have laughed up his trim cuff, Clemenceau up his wrinkled sleeve.

Finally came the grand, the fascinating, fiasco of Versailles, brilliant as so often before with the greatest figures of the day. Most brilliant was Wilson, the man of vision; House his man of execution--for in most things the two worked as one, supplementing each other. True, House did not agree in several vital points: he advised against Wilson's attending the Conference (lest he thereby lose prestige, etc.); he urged the political wisdom of including Republican Root and Taft in the mission; he favored more compromise with Clemenceau, and later the acceptance of the Lodge reservations. But he bowed to the greater man's adamantine will, contented himself with the frequent occasions when his advice was accepted; devoted his energies to the colossal double-headed chimera of a Peace in and by and through a League of Nations.

Not the least of his considerable share of the labors was to foster his cordial relations with European and Asiatic diplomats, all of whom held him in high esteem and gladly gave him their confidence when they feared his austerer chief. "All roads lead ultimately to Magnolia" (House's summer place), said Northcliffe.

House comments upon various men:

Wilson--"intellectually entirely democratic . . . unfortunate, for the reason that his mind led him where his taste rebelled."

Hoover--"the kind of man that has to have complete control in order to do the thing well."

Clemenceau--"had had a meeting with Lloyd George and the President all afternoon. I asked him how they had gotten on ... 'Splendidly, we disagreed about everything.' "

Lloyd George--"stated clearly that the time had come to decide whether to have a 'hell-peace' or a 'heaven-peace.' "

Tardieu--"the one nearly indispensable man at the Conference."

The Significance. Colonel House's activities were by preference "unofficial," and therefore inconspicuous to the general public. The publication of the first two volumes of his papers, indicating as they did his tremendous importance as adviser and negotiator, was therefore a surprise to the uninitiated, a gripe to the prejudiced. They accused House of taking too much credit to himself, thereby belittling Wilson. But if he takes co-credit, on the face of it he takes co-blame for the numerous mistakes that go up to make that tragedy of errors, 1917-19.

Somewhat over-conscious of the earlier criticism, the present volumes are at pains to re-establish the (indubitably) important part House played, and also to emphasize House's deep admiration for Wilson's genius, even after their close friendship had waned. Above all, the papers are invaluable as historical source material, ranking with Ambassador Page's Letters, and the Wilson papers Ray Stannard Baker is editing. Selected, arranged, and linked by Professor Seymour's lucid comment, the Intimate Papers are intensely interesting, indispensable to any adequate understanding of War burdens, post-War intrigues.

The Arranger. Soft-voiced, suavely clad, brilliant Charles Seymour took a B. A. from Cambridge University when he was 19, then sailed home to his native New Haven, Conn., and took another B. A. from Yale. Since then the bright facets of Professor Seymour's mind have received an exquisite polish in the process of acquiring numerous exalted degrees, teaching history at Yale, helping to make it at the Paris Peace Conference, and writing or "arranging" various books dealing with the more secret phases of the War.

If Georges Clemenceau, whom Charles Seymour greatly admires, is a tiger, the Professor may be compared without disparagement to some less brusque and silkier member of the same cat tribe. His silky discretion, masking the claws of a tiger-keen mind, probably attracted the especially feline Colonel House. A final seal was set upon their friendship when Professor Seymour was asked to edit the confidential papers of the discreetest statesman of the War.