Turkey vs. Britain

In the Near East, notorious for its intricate problems and as the breeding ground of intrigue, a disturbing echo was heard.

The Lausanne Treaty (TIME, August 6, 1923) left undone one thing that it should have done: the settlement of the Iraq-Turkish boundary.* It was understood that Britain (holding a League of Nations mandate for Iraq) and Turkey were to solve the problem between themselves; and, if agreement were impossible, they were to refer their dispute to the League.

Agreement was impossible. Turkey set covetous eyes on Mosul, synonym for oil; Britain set faith on the adage "possession is nine points of the law." Turkey recognized one boundary line; Britain another. Result: Both became engaged in recriminations because the one had invaded the other's territory.

Ismet Pasha, Turkish Foreign Minister, swearing by all his gods that Turkish troops had not crossed the boundary (i.e.. the boundary as set by Turkey), warned the League, last week, that if British troops committed acts of aggression on the frontier, Britain must shoulder the entire responisiblity.

Premier Ramsay MacDonald of Britain, expostulating that British troops had remained on the Iraq side of the frontier (i.e., what Britain said was the Iraq side), requested the League for an immediate Council meeting to deal with the difficulty. The Council of the League informed Sir Eric Drummond, League Secretary General, that it would hold "as soon as possible" an extraordinary session to consider the Anglo-Turkish dispute.

*The boundary line was defined in the Treaty of Sevres (1920); but as Turkey refused to ratify the Treaty, the boundary question was left unsettled.