Anthracitis

Only a good dramatist can write the last act of a drama without letting suspense fall. Fate is such a dramatist. The last week of the coal quandary found actors and audience equally anxious for the outcome, equally ignorant of the event. With Sept. 1 only a few days away, the anthracite uncertainty drew to a rapid close--either strike or peace. Nobody knew. But the grave dramatis personae spiritedly played their allotted parts:

Miners and Operators. Meeting again at Atlantic City the principals in the plot came more rapidly to a disagreement that heretofore in the series of conferences. Without touching on the check-off question they deadlocked over wages. The miners asked $2 a day more for day men, a 20% increase for contract workers; the operators refused. The operators offered to arbitrate; the miners refused. The operators offered to adjourn until the following day; the miners refused. They then agreed to adjourn to reassemble at the call of the joint secretary.

Neither side moved to resume negotiations. After keeping their delegation together for a time, the miners' officials advised local unions that no new contract had been agreed on and that operations would be "automatically suspended" with the end of the present contract on Sept. 1.

Coal Commission. John Hays Hammond, Chairman of the Coal Commission, announced that the Commission had done its best to bring the operators and miners to an agreement and would do no more. But the Coal Commission whispered volubly in the Presidential ear.

One more stroke was prepared by the Commission--a report fixing the blame for the failure of miners and operators to reach an agreement. Publication of the report was delayed, however, for fear that it might hinder the progress of peace negotiations.

Chairman Hammond said in no uncertain terms that operators and miners would be fools if they allowed a strike on Sept. 1--because substitute fuels would displace anthracite, to the detriment of all those in the industry. In some quarters it is believed that John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers, is intent on forcing a strike and gaining a decisive victory to increase his prestige when a new soft coal wage agreement will be negotiated on April 1 next.

President. Mr. Coolidge has remained personally quiescent, taking active cognizance of the anthracite situation only through agents. He authorized Federal Fuel Distributor Wadleigh to take measures for supplying substitute fuels to the East if a strike occurs, and asked Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania to take a hand in bringing miners and operators to an agreement.

Fuel Distributor. Francis R. Wadleigh is still occupying the office of Federal Fuel Distributor designed to meet the recent coal emergencies of the country. His term of office terminates on Sept. 22, but in the event of an anthracite strike he will continue to function indefinitely. On the President's authorization he summoned the Governors of eleven states (all New England, as well as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland) to send representatives to a conference in New York in order to form plans for getting soft coal and coke to these states in case of a hard coal strike. The soft coal operators have suggested plans for such an event. Mr. Wadleigh's proposals were not dissimilar. On the shoulders of this official--whose existence the public has almost forgotten--will rest the burden of supplying fuel in event of a strike.

Soft Coal Miners. Talk among officials of soft coal miners' unions indicated that there might be a sympathetic strike in the soft coal mines to prevent the use of soft coal as a substitute fuel. This would be a breach of contract on the part of the soft coal miners. John L. Lewis hastened to deny that any such strike would take place. Mr. Lewis is keenly aware that such strikes weaken the prestige of the United Mine Workers with the public, and give grounds for similar violations of contract by the operators.

Gifford Pinchot. The Governor of Pennsylvania, within whose state practically all of the hard coal mines are situated, has in many ways more power in dealing with miners and operators than the President of the United States. On that account Mr. Coolidge asked Governor Pinchot to undertake intervention, in the anthracite quarrel.

Some people regarded this as a political mistake on the President's part, for if Mr. Pinchot is successful it would add a national lustre to a name which already is mentioned as a significant contender with the name of Coolidge for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1924. Others less politically minded regard it as an evidence of "large caliber " in the President.

Governor Pinchot promptly summoned a conference of miners and operators at Harrisburg. Those who know Mr. Pinchot say that he is prepared to bring about peace " with conciliation if can be, with fire and sword if need be." His record of Rooseveltian vigor as Governor of Pennsylvania lends color to this belief. When the conference assembled Governor Pinchot spoke, declaring that a settlement--and hence a compromise--was imperative in the public interest. He then went into secret conferences with the members of each group separately.

Consumers. The public which burns anthracite was assured from Government sources that there are now about 25,000,000 tons of anthracite above ground, which should last for some time at the usual rate of consumption of about 2,000,000 tons a week. It is further declared that all necessary soft coal can be produced as substitute for deficiencies. The chief problem will be to educate the anthracite-using East to the high art of burning bituminous coal, an art which the West has long practiced.